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Abstract in English
Statutory tax rates have declined in the European Union in the recent decades. An applied
general equilibrium model on corporate taxation sheds light on the economic and welfare
implications of tax rate reforms. Domestic distortions proof highly relevant as even unilateral
reductions of the corporate income tax rate might reduce welfare if the labour tax rate has to be
increased. Profit shifting induces countries to underbid each others tax rates, but this effect is
sizable only if two countries are closely linked. The harmful external effects of CIT rate
reductions are limited, which reduces the need for European coordination of CIT rates.
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Abstract in Dutch
Statutaire Vpb-tarieven zijn in de afgelopen decennia gedaald in Europa. Een toegepast
algemeen evenwichtsmodel voor vennootschapsbelasting geeft inzicht in de economische en
welvaartseffecten van belastinghervormingen. Binnenlandse verstoringen blijken belangrijk te
zijn: zelfs een unilaterale verlaging van de tarieven kan ten koste gaan van welvaart door de
benodigde verhoging van de belasting op looninkomen. Winstverschuiving is een belangrijke
reden voor landen om onder elkaars tarieven te duiken, vooral als landen economisch sterk met
elkaar verbonden zijn. De nadelige externe effecten van belastingverlagingen zijn echter
beperkt, wat de noodzaak voor Europese coordinatie beperkt.
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Preface
The tax on corporate income is under pressure. During the past decade, many countries reduced
their tax rates in an attempt to attract foreign investment and profits. The theoretical and
empirical literature on the pros and cons of tax competition is rich, but an integrated framework
is hardly used. The current research project develops an applied general equilibrium model for
corporate income taxation in the European Union. In this first application of the model, a
thorough analysis of tax rate changes, both unilateral reductions and coordinated changes, is
made. The investigation of proposals by the European Commission for tax base harmonisation is
left for further research.
Leon Bettendorf, Joeri Gorter and Albert van der Horst have written this report, which is part of
the project on “Tax/benefit systems and growth potential of the EU” (TAXBEN, Project no.
SCS8-CT-2004-502639), financed by the European Commission under FP6 of DG Research.
The authors benefited from contributions and comments by Lans Bovenberg, Harry Huizinga
and Gaëtan Nicodème, and by their CPB colleagues, in particular George Gelauff, Arjan Lejour,
Ruud de Mooij and Twan Verschaeren. Discussions in response to presentations at the TaxBen
workshops in Helsinki and The Hague, at the Ministry of Finance and at CPB are gratefully
acknowledged.
Coen Teulings
Director
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Summary
Capital market integration within the European has been successful. It brings about a superior
allocation of capital over member states by linking capital markets. But capital market
integration also links national capital income taxes. Member states have indeed reduced their
statutory corporate income tax rates in order to attract highly mobile paper profits of
multinational firms. Yet effective capital income tax rates have remained relatively stable. The
evidence thus suggests that there is more to tax competition than the canonical tax race bottom.
The economic literature on tax competition, both empirical and theoretical, features a plethora of
international spillovers. For example, tax induced capital flight constitutes a positive spillover,
whereas tax exportation through foreign ownership constitutes a negative spillover. Moreover,
whether or not an individual member state benefits from an unilateral change in capital income
taxation depends heavily on accompanying changes of labour income or consumption taxation.
An assessment of the welfare cost of tax competition, and thus the potential welfare gain of tax
coordination, depends on the size and interplay of these factors. An applied general equilibrium
model is needed, bringing together the insights that are at present still scattered over the existing
literature. CORTAX is such a model. It is custom made for the problem at hand, as it
distinguishes between domestic and multinational firms in order to simulate the simultaneous
impact of capital income taxation on foreign direct investment, profit shifting and tax exporting.
The international spillovers can be substantial. An unilateral reduction of the corporate income
tax rate of five percentage points may cause a 0.1 percent moderation of foreign GDP, depending
on the openness of the countries involved. In general, the more open member states are, and the
stronger the links between their capital markets, the stronger are the spillovers.
Given the size of the spillovers, one may expect that individual member states have strong
incentives to engage in tax competition. This is not necessarily true, for several reasons. First, it
depends on the scope of the international linkages, which is however quite weak for many EU
member states. Therefore, whether or not an individual member state benefits from an unilateral
reduction of its corporate income tax rate depends not so much on the international spillovers,
but crucially on the way it finances the reduction. If labour income taxation is the balancing
item, then most member states do better to maintain the corporate income tax rate at its current
level, or even to increase it. Finally, if it expects other member states to follow suit, the benefits
are eroded further.
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The relatively weak incentives imply that tax competition entails modest welfare costs. Several
countries benefit from cutting their tax rates on corporate income, by attracting foreign profits
and investment, but they will not completely abandon the CIT. Other countries, in contrast,
should be reluctant to cut their CIT-rates, as the alternative sources of financing are too
expensive. European coordination of CIT rates, either by imposing a minimum rate or by
harmonising all rates, therefore benefits some countries, harm others, but hardly improves
welfare for the EU as a whole.
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1 Introduction
“However, a full welfare cost assessment of differences in effective corporation tax rates would
require a broader analysis, taking into account the existence of other taxes and other economic
parameters, as well as national preferences for equity and the provision of public goods.”
(European Commission, 2001b, p. 2)
Tax competition has led to a reduction in corporate income tax (CIT) rates, but has yet not
triggered a race to the bottom (Mendoza and Tesar, 2005): tax rates have declined, but tax
revenues have been remarkable stable. Concerning tax rates in Europe, one CIT-reform after the
other is implemented. Well known is the example of Ireland, which has cut its tax rate with
27.5%-point in ten years time (1995-2005), cf. European Commission (2006, p83). Austria1 has
cut its rate with 9 per cent to 25 per cent in 2005 and the Netherlands has cut their tax rates from
34.5% to 29% and has recently proposed to set the rate at 25.5% in 2007. Interestingly, an
advisory committee of the Dutch government (Council of State) states that tax-rate reduction in
the Netherlands may trigger responses in other European member states.2 In other words, the
risk of a race to the bottom is deliberately taken into account.
The theoretical tax competition literature provides an abundance of often contrastive tenets.
The CIT of one member state leads to capital flight to other member states, and thus entails a
positive spillover as capital flight increases foreign CIT-bases and labour productivities. The
domestic CIT-bill is, however, picked up by foreigners insofar they own stocks of domestic
firms, and thus entails also a negative spillover. Moreover, if a member state decides to engage in
tax competition and reduces its CIT-rate, then it must mend the resulting budgetary hole, either
by cutting public expenditure or by increasing the burden of alternative taxes. In particular the
labour income tax carries heavy domestic distortions that make it unattractive to go down this
route, even in the face of the high capital mobility within the EU.
Economists still grope in the dark regarding the empirical relevance of the contrastive tenets.
Does the downward pressure on CIT-rates dominate the upward pressure, and if so, to what
extent? And what is the welfare cost of tax competition, or similarly, the potential welfare gain
of tax coordination, as asked for in the quote by the European Commission?3 This requires an
integrated framework.
1 The key motivation for the Austrian government is that “(t)his reform put Austria in a competitive position in comparison
with countries like Slovenia and the Czech Republic as a destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). The business
location Austria now offers the second lowest corporate tax rate to corporate investors within the European Union.”
(www.austriantrade.org/united-kingdom/austria-in-the-uk/news/article/1031/2147/hash/3215d1e339/en/)
2 Council of State, Advice No. W06.06.0125/IV, The Hague, May 10, 2006.
3 In this paper we focus on competition and coordination in tax rates. In a subsequent paper, we intend to simulate
proposals on the consolidation of the tax base.
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CORTAX is an applied general equilibrium model of the EU tailor made for the problem at hand.
It builds on the model presented by Sørensen (2004a). CORTAX goes, however, in some
directions one step further. Notably the savings decision is derived from dynamic utility
maximisation. Not only does this do justice to the inherently dynamic nature of saving, but it
also allows a consistent welfare analysis. Moreover, CORTAX investigates a wider array of tax
coordination proposals. A central result of the simulations is that a typical member state has only
a small incentive to unilaterally reduce its CIT-rate. Consequently, the welfare cost of tax
competition is relatively small, and may even be negative for some member states. The main
reason is that if alternative tax instruments are used as balancing items, the benefits of a lower
CIT are partly or entirely outweighed by the costs of a higher labour income or consumption tax.
This is a fortiori true if member states expect their opponents in the tax competition game to
follow suit.
If the incentives for member states to engage in tax competition are weak, then the welfare
cost of tax competition or the welfare gain of tax coordination are modest. The costs or gains
are, however, unequally distributed over member states. In fact, under either tax competition or
tax coordination some member states win, while others lose. These conflicting interests explain
why progress in tax coordination is difficult to achieve in practice, all the more since the total
welfare gain in the EU seems to be quite modest.
This paper does not deviate from the custom to enumerate the contents of the remaining
sections. Section 2 reviews the theoretical tax competition literature and presents the stylised
facts regarding international CIT developments. Section 3 presents our applied general
equilibrium model CORTAX. Sections 4 and 5 are dedicated to the results of simulated unilateral
and multilateral CIT-reductions. Section 6 contains a sensitivity analysis, and section 7
concludes.
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2 Theory and facts
This section sets the stage for our model simulations. It contains a review of the stylised facts
regarding international CIT developments, as well as a review of the distinct tenets of the
theoretical tax competition literature. An eclectic confrontation of facts and theory is, however,
insufficient to estimate the welfare cost of tax competition or the welfare gain of tax
coordination. For such an exercise an AGE model of the EU is needed, with a focus on CIT
institutions.
2.1 Capital market integration and tax competition
The shaping of the internal market of the EU has been particularly successful with respect to the
freedom of movement of capital. Investment and portfolio positions have become international,
as indicated by Figure 2.1. It displays the sum of foreign assets and liabilities of eighteen EU
member states as a proportion of their combined GDP. This measure of capital market
integration has increased from 0.6 in 1970 to 5.0 in 2004, with a clear acceleration from 1992
onwards, the year in which the treaty of Maastricht was signed.
Figure 2.1 Capital market integration for the EU18a
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a Source: own calculations for the EU15, CZE, POL and HUN on the basis of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Integration is measured
as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a fraction of GDP.
A by-product of capital market integration is that multinational firms can more easily reduce
their total corporate income tax (CIT) bill by shifting real and financial capital to low tax
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member states. Therefore, member states that decrease their (effective) CIT rate attract FDI and
paper profits. Capital market integration also implies that part of the CIT bill is picked up by
foreigners as they hold a substantial proportion of the corporate stocks. Therefore, member
states that increase their (effective) CIT rate ‘export’ a part of the CIT burden. In either case,
corporate income taxation comprises international spillovers, albeit contrastive ones.
Disregard of international spillovers may lead to unilateral CIT reforms that are suboptimal
from the perspective of the EU as a whole. The welfare cost of these reforms depends on the
sign and magnitude of the spillovers. An extensive welfare analysis should, however, also
include the CIT induced change of savings and the CIT induced change of capital flows between
the EU and the rest of the world. They determine the total stock of investment for which member
states compete. Hence tax competition is not a zero sum game for the EU.
Eyeball analyses of CIT developments suggest that the balance of international spillovers tips
towards a downward pressure on CIT rates. Figure 2.2 shows that both statutory and effective
rates in the OECD have decreased in conjunction with capital market integration. The mean
statutory rate has, however, decreased more rapidly than the mean effective marginal tax rate
(EMTR) and the mean effective average tax rate (EATR).4 It implies that the decrease of the
statutory CIT rate has partly been financed by broadening of the CIT base, in particular by
restrictions on depreciation allowances. Consequently, the CIT revenue as a percentage of either
GDP or total tax revenues has remained relatively stable.
Falling (effective) CIT rates are only indicative of countries underbidding each others’ tax
rates. There are alternative explanations of the observed trends. Rate reductions with base
broadening are not confined to CIT, but have taken place elsewhere in tax systems. There
international spillovers are much weaker, suggesting that purely domestic considerations related
to equity, efficiency, and simplicity play a role. Moreover, the strong lobby of multinational
firms may have resulted in the reforms that disproportionately benefits them. Furthermore,
governments may seek to attract the highly profitable investment projects, which net return
responds relatively strongly to rate reductions, and relatively weakly to base broadening. Finally,
governments may mimic successful tax reforms of their neighbours without a clear
understanding of their strategic interdependence.
Hence economists have sought to test tax competition more directly. Brueckner and Saavedra
(2001) and Büttner (1999) find a positive slope of best response functions of local jurisdictions,
implying that the a decrease of the tax burden in one jurisdiction is matched by a decrease in
neighbouring ones. In a similar vein Devereux et al. (2004) present evidence of CIT competition
at the country level. Carlsen et al. (2005) find that jurisdictions hosting a relatively large amount
of mobile firms set relatively low tax rates. Krogstrup (2004) distills a number of testable
4 For a discussion of the calculation and interpretation of effective tax rates, see European Commission (2001a) and
Gorter and De Mooij (2001).
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Figure 2.2 Downward pressure on statutory and effective CIT (% change 1982-2001)
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Source: Devereux et al. (2002).
hypotheses from the theoretical tax competition literature. She finds strong evidence of a
negative relation between international capital mobility and CIT burdens, and somewhat weaker
evidence of a positive relation between country size, agglomeration, or foreign ownership and
CIT burdens.
2.2 Domestic considerations
Opponents of tax competition implicitly assume that a CIT is worth having in the first place.
This is not an undisputed conclusion. The CIT distorts investment decisions and may hurt
economic growth, a relation indeed found by Lee and Gordon (2005). Furthermore, the CIT is
sometimes criticised for its indirectness, since its final incidence falls not on corporations, but on
individual stockholders as lower dividends and on individual employees as lower wages.
Allocating corporate income to individual stockholders carries, however, prohibitively high
transaction costs. Hence Cnossen (2003) concludes that the choice is not between the CIT and
other capital income taxes, but between the CIT and no capital income tax at all. If indeed the
curtain would fall for the CIT, governments would have to resort to levying potentially more
distorting taxes. After all, the CIT creams off economic rents generated by infra-marginal
investment projects, while the deadweight loss at the margin of the labour income tax may be
substantial due to the height of the prevailing rates.
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De Mooij (2005) puts forward some additional arguments in support of the CIT. It serves as a
backstop for the personal income tax as it discourages entrepreneurs to incorporate for evasion
purposes. It also mitigates disincentives to invest in human capital as it creates a level playing
field for investment in physical and human capital. Often overlooked is its function as an quasi
insurance as it reduces the variation in after-tax rates of return. Finally, it facilitates income
redistribution.
2.3 International considerations
2.3.1 Positive spillovers – profit shifting
The basic tax competition story is simple. Capital market integration prompts member states to
undercut each others CIT rates in order to attract internationally mobile capital. This puts the
solvency of public budgets under pressure.5 It leaves member states with the dilemma either to
decrease public good provision and income redistribution, or to increase the tax burden on
labour income or consumption.
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) were among the first to coin a formal model of the basic
story. Governments uncooperatively set source based taxes on capital income. They do this in a
world where capital is perfectly mobile. Thus taxation leads to capital flight as investment flows
towards locations where it yields the highest net rate of return. Since capital flight broadens
foreign tax bases, capital income taxation comprises a positive international spillover. Hence, in
the Nash equilibrium of the tax game, tax rates are suboptimally low.
In the parsimonious basic model, the suboptimally low tax rates lead to a deficient supply of
public goods. In the richer models of Gottschalk and Peters (2003), Huber (1999), Kessler and
Myers (2002) and Sinn (1998a) low tax rates also imply deficient income redistribution.
2.3.2 Negative spillovers – tax exporting
Member states may, however, also be tempted to set excessively high CIT rates. The rationale is
export of the CIT burden. It runs through two channels. First, Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) point
out that foreign stockholders contribute to domestic CIT revenues. Second, Bucovetsky (1991)
and Kanbur and Keen (1993) show that foreign capital owners contribute to domestic CIT
revenues if the CIT decreases the gross rate of return to investment on the international capital
market. Similarly, Davies (2005) and Noiset (2003) show that foreign consumers contribute to
domestic CIT revenues if the CIT leads to higher prices on international consumer markets.
Thus tax export may be direct and indirect through price changes on international imperfectly
competitive markets.
5 These spillovers are considered positive as a tax increase would benefit other countries.
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The empirical evidence of tax export is mixed. Gravelle and Smetters (2001) conclude on the
basis of simulations with a calibrated model of the US economy and the rest of the world that a
large part of the CIT burden is indeed exported to foreign investors. Eijffinger and Wagner
(2001) and Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006) also report a substantial tax export. In contrast,
Krogstrup (2004) finds only a weak relation between foreign ownership and CIT rates.
Moreover, the conjunction of capital market integration and decreasing statutory and effective
tax rates suggests that, however important tax export may be, classical tax competition
dominates. This is in line with Sørensen (2001a), who argues that foreign ownership of domestic
firms would have to be implausibly large, for the tendency toward overprovision of public
services due to the potential for tax exporting, to outweigh the downward pressure on service
levels from tax competition.
2.4 Other considerations
2.4.1 Public goods
If relatively high CIT rates are made up for by a highly educated workforce, by superior
infrastructure, or by other public goods that raise the marginal productivity of capital, then tax
induced capital flight is mitigated. Therefore, Devereux et al. (2002) claim that actual tax
competition is much weaker than suggested by the basic tax competition model.
Nevertheless, distortions remain. Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) claim that the ability of
multinational firms to shift paper profits across borders by transfer pricing or thin capitalization,
detaches the CIT base from real investment. Thus, multinational firms can make use of public
goods in one member state, while paying CIT in another. For this reason Sinn (1998b) doubts
that an efficient supply of public goods can be financed with benefit taxes on capital income. It
may be necessary to subsidise this factor in the sense that some of the public goods it uses will
have to be covered by taxes on other factors. But even if capital income taxes suffice to finance
an efficient supply of public goods, the outcome may still be suboptimal. Matsumoto (2004)
demonstrates that a tax benefit system with internationally mobile production factors leads to
excessive expenditure on public goods that complement the mobile factor.
2.4.2 Leviathan
If governments are not benevolent welfare maximisers, then a downward pressure on CIT rates
may be a blessing as it tends to tame the ‘leviathan’. In an attempt to formalise this argument
Edwards and Keen (1996) assume that government officials maximise a utility function that
includes both the welfare of their residents and the tax revenue diverted to their own purposes.
Tax competition limits their ability to do so, and thus may be beneficial if the propensity among
officials to waste revenue is relatively large. Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) give a more subtle
argument along the same line. Government failure outweighs market failure if tax revenue has to
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be raised (partly) by distortionary taxes on capital income. Also in this case tax competition
countervails the implied excessive size of the public sector.
2.4.3 Agglomeration rents
CIT does not lead to capital flight insofar profits are location specific. Governments can, and
should tax these profits as they constitute an immobile base. The new economic geography
literature explains why profits are location specific, even if capital is internationally mobile ex
ante. Agglomeration externalities – a catchall for the benefits of co-location of firms – lock
capital into relatively productive core locations. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Kind et al.
(2000) demonstrate that this gives rise to a sustainable tax gap, being the maximum difference
between the tax burden in the core and the periphery. Agglomeration externalities let in the
possibility of a tax rate to the top: market integration as measured by decreasing trade costs may
strengthen the benefits of co-location, and thus increase the sustainable tax gap.
2.5 Tax competition and welfare
Since both statutory and effective CIT rates have decreased over the last decades, and since more
sophisticated empirical analyses reveal a net downward pressure, tax competition seems to
dominate tax export. This suggests that CIT rates tend to be inefficiently low, at least if one
abstracts from waste of tax revenues by officials of a leviathan government.
Moreover, statutory CIT rates have decreased more rapidly than effective CIT rates. This can
be understood by distinguishing between different kinds of capital. Paper profits constitute a
highly mobile tax base that responds primarily to variation in statutory CIT rates. Real
investment constitutes a less mobile tax base that responds to variation in effective CIT rates
since depreciation allowances and other measures that broaden the CIT base are linked not to
paper profits but to buildings, machinery and inventories. Governments fearing an erosion of
their CIT base by capital flight thus do wise to pamper paper profits.
The theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition does not allow a rock solid
conclusion about the welfare cost of tax competition, or the (potential) welfare gain of tax
coordination. Distinct contributions, focusing on distinct facets of tax competition, yield
conflicting results. Griffith and Klemm (2004) note that while the view that capital mobility puts
downward pressure on corporate income taxes is more widely held than the opposite view, there
is little consensus on whether this is beneficial, harmful or irrelevant to economic welfare.
Zodrow (2003) concludes therefore that what is needed is a model that integrates the
contributions, and that allows a quantification of the negative as well as the positive spillovers.
The next paragraph surveys the brief literature on applied models, which previews our own
contribution in this area.
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2.5.1 Applied general equilibrium models on corporate taxation
Applied general equilibrium (AGE) models are designed to provide an integrated approach
quantifying the positive and negative effects of tax policies.
One strand of literature apply highly stylised models to tax competition between (blocks of)
countries. Mendoza and Tesar (1998) apply a model for the US and Europe to analyse the
economic effect of several tax reforms in the US. In their ‘two-country’ model, the spillovers
from the US to Europe are significant. In a follow-up, Mendoza and Tesar (2005) develop a
model for a few large countries in the EU. An interesting feature of their simulations is the
distinction between labour-tax and consumption-tax financing. In both cases, however, the gains
from coordination (starting from a Nash equilibrium) are limited (up to 0.26% of lifetime
consumption). This indicates, in contrast to their first paper, that the international spillovers are
of limited size. In their 2005 paper they explain the difference in results as follows: “Thus, our
findings suggest that these estimates of the benefits of tax reforms may be significantly
overstated because they do not take into account the high degree of international capital mobility
and the incentives it provides for strategic behaviour in tax policy setting.”
In similar vein, Sørensen (2000, 2004b) develops a model for optimal government behaviour
in four regions (Nordic countries, continental Europe, UK and US). The key international
spillovers are tax exporting (leading to too high uncoordinated tax rates) and competition for the
elastic supply of capital (implying low uncoordinated tax rates). The latter effect dominates in
the simulations: a coordinated (between the three EU-blocks) CIT-policy generates an increase
in CIT-rates of 12%-points on average, generating a welfare gain of less than 0.2% of GDP
(Sørensen, 2000, Table 4). Similarly small welfare effects are obtained by Brueckner (2001)
who shows with simulations of a stylised model that the welfare loss due to tax competition is
less than 1% of GDP and Parry (2003) who shows in the same vein that the welfare gains of tax
coordination are fairly modest, and may even disappear in the light of Leviathan behaviour of
governments. The contribution of this literature is that it highlights the key mechanisms behind
tax competition in an integrated way. The limitation is, however, the still highly stylised nature,
implying that the simulations should be seen as ‘theory with numbers’.
The answer is a more realistic modelling with institutional detail for a large group of
countries, which comes, however, at the expense of theoretical rigour – for example tax
competition where countries optimally respond to each other cannot be investigated anymore.
An example is Sørensen (2002, 2004a) who developed the model OECDTAX for 24 OECD
countries.6 In his 2002-paper on German tax reforms, Sørensen concludes that the effects of the
German reform on other OECD economies are quite small. Sørensen (2004a) simulates an
European harmonisation of both the tax rate and the tax base. He finds welfare effects between a
small loss of 0.04%GDP in Denmark and Sweden and a welfare gain of 0.28%GDP in Belgium.
6 See section 3.2.6 for a technical comparison of our model with OECDTAX.
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On average, the EU benefits slightly (0.18%GDP) “.. since harmonization of the source-based
corporation tax reduces cross-country differences in required pre-tax rates of return, leading to a
more efficient allocation of capital across Europe” (Sørensen, 2004a, p. 111). Finally,
Copenhagen Economics (2004) use an updated version of OECDTAX to investigate tax base
harmonisation, with various assumptions on tax rate policies, like harmonisation of the tax rate
or a minimum tax rate. Their simulated welfare effects are more diverse than in Sørensen
(2004a), ranging between a loss of 0.2%GDP and a gain of 0.7%GDP.
Our contribution to this literature is a thorough investigation of the economic and welfare
effects of unilateral and multilateral tax reforms in Europe, by developing and simulating the
applied general equilibrium model CORTAX for corporate taxation in Europe. This provides
insight in how individual member states might be affected by CIT-reductions in either the home
country or in other member states. In addition, we show which countries gain from imposing a
European minimum tax rate or, similar to Sørensen (2004a), from even harmonising their tax
rates. The OECDTAX-version used in Copenhagen Economics (2004) also uses country-specific
fiscal depreciation rates (but these values are not reported). In contrast to our approach, this rate
is calibrated with the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP. As a major consequence, Germany
is characterised by a narrow tax base, while the opposite holds in our model. This different
choice explains differences in results, as Germany is a dominating economy in the EU.
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3 Overview of the model and calibration
This section describes the general equilibrium model CORTAX, which is designed for the
analysis of corporate income taxation in the EU. After the model is non-technically described,
the calibration procedure is briefly discussed. We have been inspired by OECDTAX, which has
been developed by Sørensen (2001b). A final subsection compares our model with OECDTAX.
3.1 Non-technical description of the model
The model is applied to 17 EU countries, covering the 15 old member states (with BEL and
LUX joined) and three largest new member states (CZE, HUN and POL). Each of these
countries is modelled as a small, open economy. All countries produce one homogenous good at
the exogenous world price. The rate of return on the two assets, debt and equity, are given from
the world capital market; i.e. we assume the EU to be unable to affect interest rates.7 We briefly
discuss the structure of CORTAX per sector; a complete technical description can be found in
Bettendorf and Van der Horst (2006).
3.1.1 Households
The specification of the households is based on the overlapping generations model of Diamond,
which endogenises savings and allows for welfare analysis in a dynamic context. An individual
is assumed to live for two periods: a working period and a retirement period.8 As a consequence,
one young generation coexist with one old generation in each period.
Taxes on labour and consumption might serve as alternatives for the corporate income tax.
Labour is supplied elastically by young households in order to allow for employment and
welfare effects of labour-tax changes. Older households have stopped working. Households
receive labour income (when young), capital income (when old) and lump sum transfers. Total
income is spent on consumption when young and old. Resulting savings can be invested in
bonds and stocks. Since both asset types are specified as imperfect substitutes, an investor will
always diversify his portfolio over both assets (bonds of different origin are considered perfect
substitutes, and the same holds for domestic and foreign equities). Household decisions follow
from maximising lifetime utility.
7 In section 5.2 we consider an extension in which world interest rates are affected by reforms in the EU.
8 A period is assumed to span 40 years. The model is expressed in annual terms by assuming that behaviour is the same
in each year of the period when young and when old.
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3.1.2 Firms
Three types of firms are distinguished: domestic firms, multinational headquarters and
subsidiaries of multinationals. The introduction of multinationals is essential for the analysis of
the impact of corporate income taxation on profit shifting and FDI, see section 2.3. The three
types of firms all produce one homogenous good. Production of each firm requires the input of
labour, physical capital and location specific capital. Labour is not subject to tax competition as
it is assumed to be internationally immobile. Location specific capital is internationally
immobile too, and, in contrast to labour, supplied inelastically. Its return (an agglomeration rent)
is assumed to fall under the corporate income tax, which makes this part of the tax on corporate
income nondistortive. The corporate income tax is only distortive when the tax base exceeds the
income earned by location specific capital.
Physical capital is perfectly mobile internationally. Although the gross rate of return is fixed
at the world capital market, the user cost of capital depends on country-specific corporate and
personal taxation systems. Investments can be financed by issuing bonds or by retaining profits
(issuing new shares is not allowed). The firm can deduct interest payments on bonds from its
taxable profits, next to depreciation allowances. As a consequence, debt financing is in general
the most attractive alternative. To avoid extreme debt positions and guarantee that investments
are partially financed with equity, a cost on extreme debt positions is incurred.9
Optimal input demands are derived from maximising the value of the firm. The rate at which
future profits are discounted has to be equal to the rate of return required by the marginal equity
holder. The marginal investor is assumed to live in the home country, implying that the required
return on the firms’ equity is determined by the domestic household and therefore by the tax rate
the latter has to pay on equity income.
Multinationals differ from domestic firms by assuming that they operate a subsidiary in each
foreign country.10 Decisions of a multinational aim to maximise the sum of the values of all its
firms. This implies that the fraction of the subsidiary’s capital stock that is not debt financed (i.e.
foreign direct investment) should yield the rate on return required on the parent’s equity.
Production in a subsidiary needs in addition an intermediate input that is provided by its parent
company. Since tax bases are not consolidated, profits can be shifted between countries by
charging a transfer price for intermediate inputs that deviates from the real cost. Profit shifting
remains bounded by specifying compliance costs on transfer pricing. Fixed income generated by
a subsidiary is assumed to accrue to residents of the home country. Raising the CIT rate thus
decreases the after-tax fixed income of foreign beneficiaries, which allows countries to export
part of the tax burden.
9 Reasonable values for the debt ratio are obtained by specifying that the firm has to bear financial distress costs when
the debt ratio deviates from a threshold level.
10 Multinationals do not decide on the location of its subsidiaries, only on its sizes. Multinationals are assumed to operate
only in other EU countries, but not in the rest of the world (and vice versa). As a consequence, profit shifting is limited to
the EU.
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3.1.3 Government
Tax revenues consist of source-based taxes on corporate income and residence-based taxes on
labour income, dividends, capital gains, interest income and consumption. The focus on the pure
regime for corporate taxation can be motivated by the observation in Devereux (2004) that
‘Although in many countries the legal basis of taxation is on a residence basis, in practice the
vast bulk of the international taxation of company equity income is on a source basis’. He also
states that only little revenue is raised in the residence country.
The expenditures side contains government consumption, interest payments on bonds11 and
lump sum transfers. We abstract from government objectives like maximising households wealth
or their own revenues, which excludes the analysis of strategic interactions and leviathan
behaviour. The key function of the government is to remain solvent by compensating corporate
income tax reductions by alternative sources of finance or a reduction in (non-distortive) income
transfers.
3.1.4 Market equilibrium
The equilibrium condition for each market is as follows:
• The labour market: domestic supply has to meet domestic demand; wages are therefore country
specific.
• The goods market: the surplus of production over domestic demand leads to net exports; the
goods price acts as numeraire.
• The bonds market: all types of bonds (domestic or foreign, issued by firms or government) are
perfect substitutes with fixed return; the net supply of bonds by the rest of world is assumed
perfectly elastic.
• The equity market: all types of equity (domestic or foreign) are perfect substitutes with fixed
return; the net supply of equity by the rest of the world is assumed perfectly elastic.
• The balance of payments is balanced (i.e. the current account equals the change in the net
foreign asset position) if all previous markets are in equilibrium (due to Walras law).
3.2 Calibration
We discuss the most important assumptions and choices we have made in the calibration of the
model. We refer to Bettendorf and Van der Horst (2006) for a more detailed discussion.
Whenever possible, we have used 2002 as our reference year, the final year for which the
required data is available.
11 Debt accumulation follows from the assumption that the public debt/GDP ratio is constant.
23
3.2.1 Households
The consumption share in GDP is taken from the National Accounts (source OECD). Statistics
on labour force, employment in persons and hours worked per person are combined to calculate
labour supply. Population growth is uniform at the EU-average. Values chosen for key
parameters are listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Key parameters and (semi-)elasticities for households
Population growth 0.5%
Real return on bonds 2.0%
Real return on equity 4.0%
Rate of time preference 1.0%
Elasticities of substitution
Intertemporal 0.5
Intratemporal (consumption-leisure) 1.0
Bonds-Equity 4.0
Implied (semi-)elasticities min max
Labour supply to wage 0.12 0.28
Savings to interest rate 0.35 0.80
Evers et al. (2005) conclude from a meta analysis that the uncompensated wage elasticity of
labour supply is about 0.1 for men and 0.5 for women. Our simulated wage elasticities for all
workers, using the partial model for household behaviour, fit nicely in this range.
The real interest rate proxies the average of 2003-2005 of the yield of the 30-years
index-linked OATs. The range of implied interest elasticities of total savings shows small but
positive values.
3.2.2 Production
The capital and labour parameters in the production functions are predominantly determined by
the country-specific labour income shares (corrected for the self-employed). Little evidence is
available for the share of intermediate inputs in the production function of subsidiaries. The
share of imported intermediate inputs in GDP can be obtained from the National Accounts
(about 12% on average), but likely overestimates the intra-firm trade of intermediates. We
therefore fix this share at the lower level of 10% (Sørensen (2001b)). The income share of
location specific capital, which proxies agglomeration rents, is fixed at 2.5% (cf. 5% in Sørensen
(2001b)). Country specific TFP-levels are endogenous in the calibration, but its growth rate is
fixed at 1.5%. Given the long-run character of our model, we allow for a substantial amount of
substitution between labour and capital (see Chirinko (2002)).
By fixing the amount of location specific capital used by domestic firms and multinational
headquarters, we assume that domestic firms produce about twice as much as multinational
parents (the precise figure is 0.7/0.3; cf. Sørensen (2001b)). The amount of location specific
capital used by each subsidiary is calibrated from OECD-data on bilateral FDI-stocks.
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Table 3.2 Key parameters and (semi-)elasticities of production
Technological growth 1.5%
Economic rate of depreciation 5.0%
Income share of location specific capital 2.5%
Elasticity of substitution
Labour-capital 0.7
Implied semi-elasticities min max
Capital stock to statutory CIT − 0.46 0.09
Incoming FDI to statutory CIT − 1.91 − 0.48
Debt to statutory CIT 0.23 0.38
Incoming transfer price to statutory CIT 0.74 2.14
3.2.3 Government
Key parameters of the corporate income tax are the statutory tax rate and the fiscal depreciation
rate measuring the broadness of the tax base. The legal tax rates are taken from the Institute for
Fiscal Studies, see Devereux et al. (2002), except for CZE, HUN and POL (source: Finkenzeller
and Spengel (2004)) and DNK (source: Nexia International (2005)). Starting point in the
calibration of the tax base is the marginal effective tax rate (METR) as calculated for debt and
equity financing by IFS. We assume that 25% of the new investment projects are financed with
debt and 75% with equity. This is lower than the actual debt-equity mix (40%,60%) in order to
ensure reasonable (depreciation) allowances.
Figure 3.1 Statutory and marginal effective tax rates
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Figure 3.1 shows a scatter of the statutory and the resulting marginal effective tax rates (METR).
The fiscal depreciation rate is calibrated such that this METR is reproduced, as it is the best
measure of how corporate income taxes affect the profit-maximising decision on marginal
investments.12 We restrict the fiscal depreciation rate between 5% and 15%, where the lower
bound is given by the economic rate of depreciation and the upper bound is imposed to avoid the
undesirable ‘taxation paradox’ (see e.g. Sørensen (2002)).13 When one allows for generous
depreciation allowances (large difference between fiscal and economic rate of depreciation),
simulating a reduction in the corporate tax rate might result in an increase in the cost of capital
and a reduction of the capital stock.
A drawback of this calibration procedure is that we cannot take all country-specific details of
tax regimes into account. For Germany this is indicated by the finding that the high METR is not
in line with the relatively low CIT-revenues. Another example concerns the special tax rulings in
the Netherlands aiming at attracting the location of headquarters. As a result, the simulated tax
revenues deviate from the observed tax revenues: the average revenues are lower than observed
(2.6% versus 3.0%). In an alternative procedure, we calibrated the fiscal depreciation rate on the
observed corporate tax revenues. However, this resulted in implausible high values for this rate,
that would give rise to a negative response of the capital stock to a reduction in the corporate tax
rate.
With respect to the labour and consumption tax rates, we follow Mendoza et al. (1994) to
determine the effective average tax rates from the OECD Tax Revenues and National Accounts
(NA). Government expenditures are also taken from the NA. Transfers are used to close the
government budget (ranging between 14 and 28%GDP).
3.2.4 Semi-elasticities of international linkages
FDI is one of the key links between countries. From a meta study De Mooij and Ederveen
(2003) report a typical semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to the CIT rate of −2.4 (see De Mooij
(2005, Table 2)). The simulated semi-elasticity in Table 3.2 of about −1.0 is smaller than the
mean value of the meta study, but falls in the range of estimates for the semi-elasticity with
statutory tax differentials. The latter semi-elasticity is the combined effect of the two
components of FDI, namely the foreign capital stock and the share of equity capital in foreign
capital. In view of lacking information, we assume that the capital-intensity of subsidiaries is
similar to that of domestic firms and that the share of bond-financing in both firm types is
similar. Both assumptions imply that the stock of foreign capital is as responsive to tax changes
as the stock of domestic capital, where the responsiveness of domestic capital is limited by the
complementarity with immobile labour and location specific capital.
12 European Commission (2001b, Annex A, Tables 22-23) reports statutory allowance rates for buildings and machinery
for the EU15 in 2001. Our calibrated depreciation rate is remarkably close to the allowance rate for buildings (correlation =
0.82), but it is hardly correlated with the allowance rate for machinery (-0.24).
13 Only in Greece, the small tax base still implies the taxation paradox, where a tax increase raises investments.
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Transfer pricing is the second link between countries. The impact of transfer pricing on tax
revenues is significant if transfer prices respond strongly to tax rate differentials and if the share
of intermediate inputs in multinational firms is large. Unfortunately, the evidence for calibrating
both elements is weak. The calibration of the latter share at 10% is already explained above. The
limited evidence on the elasticity of transfer prices to tax changes points to a range between 0
and 0.5, see De Mooij (2005). Evidence on the elasticity of profit shifting is given by Huizinga
and Laeven (2006), who find a macro semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top
statutory tax rate of 1.43 in Europe. In the model multinationals can only shift profits by
applying transfer prices to intra-firm flows of intermediates. To capture the more general
practice of profit shifting, we model transfer prices more sensitive to tax rate differentials in line
with Huizinga and Laeven (2006). The calibration implies an improvement of the tax revenues
due to profit shifting in the range of 10-40% of the ex ante reduction of tax revenues.
The third international link concerns the repatriation of the return to location specific capital
to the home country. The size of this link depends on the income share of 2.5%.
3.2.5 Base path
The calibration results in the base path are given in Table 3.3. We comment some typical
features that will explain differences in simulation outcomes over the countries.
1. The marginal effective tax on corporate income is much smaller than the statutory rate due to the
depreciation allowances and the deductibility of interest payments. Note that the METR is the
key signal of the CIT-distortion. Whereas the statutory rate ranges from 13% in Ireland to 40%
in Germany, the METR varies between −1% in Greece and 12% in Germany. The high statutory
tax rate in Greece is more than compensated by a high fiscal rate of depreciation, explaining the
effective subsidy on marginal investments.
2. The labour and consumption tax rates vary considerably between countries. This will matter in
tax reforms where a reduction in the CIT-rate has to be compensated with an increase in the
labour or consumption tax rate.
3. The cost of capital is mainly determined by the common gross rates of return and the economic
rate of depreciation, which explains its (relative) invariability. Still, the cost of capital is higher
in countries with high tax rates and broad tax bases.
4. The transfer price of incoming intermediates is considerably below unity in countries with a low
tax rate (IRL, HUN, POL and CZE) in order to boost the tax base in these countries.
5. In countries with a low share of wage income, which is mirrored by a high share of capital
income, the tax on corporate income is relatively more distortive than the tax on labour income,
ceteris paribus.
6. Foreign subsidiaries are important in small countries, as BLU, IRL and NLD, as indicated by the
inward FDI. The tax base in these countries is therefore highly sensitive to tax differentials.
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7. The net foreign asset position is defined as the difference between the value of all assets a
country owns and the total value of all assets issued. Countries with a positive NFA-position are
therefore net exporters of capital. We treat the NFA-position as endogenous in the calibration
procedure.
Table 3.3 Key variables and elasticities in the basic scenario
AUT BLU DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA
Tax rate on corporate income 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.35 0.13 0.38
Marginal effective tax rate 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.12 − 0.01 0.03 0.02
Fiscal depreciation rate 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.12
Tax rate on labour income 0.39 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.35
Tax rate on consumption 0.25 0.23 0.47 0.35 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.33 0.17
Cost of capital 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
Wage share (fraction GDP) 0.71 0.72 0.69 0.63 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.60 0.65
Transfer price (in) 0.95 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.01 0.70 1.05
Employmenta 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.38
Capital (fraction GDP) 3.18 2.99 3.27 3.85 3.71 3.71 3.61 4.48 4.06
Inward FDI (stock, fraction GDP) 0.13 0.60 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.58 0.04
Gross Domestic Product (EU=1) 1.17 1.17 1.19 1.10 1.19 1.05 0.76 1.48 1.00
Consumption (fraction GDP) 0.61 0.58 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.51 0.54
Net foreign assets (fraction GDP) 0.18 − 0.51 − 0.85 − 1.49 − 0.88 − 0.36 0.16 − 0.74 − 0.98
NLD PRT ESP SWE GBR CZE HUN POL
Tax rate on corporate income 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.18 0.19
Marginal effective tax rate 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05
Fiscal depreciation rate 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05
Tax rate on labour income 0.31 0.24 0.28 0.47 0.22 0.35 0.33 0.25
Tax rate on consumption 0.28 0.26 0.17 0.36 0.20 0.24 0.33 0.21
Cost of capital 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Wage share (fraction GDP) 0.69 0.77 0.64 0.72 0.74 0.60 0.63 0.68
Transfer price (in) 1.02 0.98 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.71 0.75
Employmenta 0.41 0.50 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.40 0.44
Capital (fraction GDP) 3.15 2.50 4.01 2.99 2.57 4.17 4.03 3.45
Inward FDI (stock, fraction GDP) 0.34 0.11 0.07 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.08
Gross Domestic Product (EU=1) 1.21 0.77 0.94 1.13 1.16 0.64 0.57 0.46
Consumption (fraction GDP) 0.54 0.64 0.56 0.51 0.62 0.46 0.47 0.58
Net foreign assets (fraction GDP) 0.25 2.57 − 0.24 − 0.76 1.79 − 1.37 − 0.88 0.51
a Employment as fraction of the available time for a working-age person, where each person has 2500 hours available for work annually.
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3.2.6 Comparison with OECDTAX
The specification and calibration of our model CORTAX is heavily based on OECDTAX (as
explained in Sørensen (2001b)), but some important differences should be noticed. On the one
hand, we have dropped some features of OECDTAX to get a clearer insight into the main
mechanisms driving the outcomes. In contrast to our approach, OECDTAX considers national
capital markets with endogenous rates of return. We have simplified taxation systems and
abstract from modelling housing stocks, financial institutions, imperfect labour markets and tax
havens.14
A key extension of the model is the use of a Diamond framework with overlapping
generations to model household behaviour instead of a representative agent model. The
advantage is that all behavioural equations are consistently derived from dynamic optimisation,
allowing for a proper welfare analysis. In particular the labour-supply choice appears to be
crucial in tax reforms. As in Sørensen (2001b), we will only consider the stationary long run
version of the model. Calculation of the full transition path is beyond the scope of the current
project.
Furthermore OECDTAX is applied to 24 OECD-countries, including US, whereas we focus
on the EU block. Finally, we also made some different choices in the parameterization of the
model. In particular, whereas Sørensen (2001b) considers only country-specific statutory
CIT-rates, our calibration also takes into account country-specific tax bases to mimic the
tax-distortions of marginal investment decisions.
14 In OECDTAX, the tax haven issues bonds that only can be held by foreign household investors (i.e. firms can not
benefit from the tax haven). The fraction of these assets in total bond holdings by EU-households is small (ranging from
0.3% to 1.4%).
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4 Unilateral reduction
What are the economic and welfare effects for a country and the other EU members if a single
country reduces its CIT rate? This question is investigated for France (section 4.1) and the other
EU countries in our model. The analysis for France highlights the key effects for the home
country and the other EU member states. In section 4.2, we extend the analysis to unilateral
reductions in the CIT-rate in all other countries, under the assumption that other countries do not
respond.15
4.1 Unilateral reduction of the CIT-rate in France
4.1.1 Implications for the economy and welfare in France
Consider a reduction in the CIT-rate of France by 5%-point, which amounts to an ex-ante
reduction in tax revenues of 0.41% GDP. In the first discussion of this CIT-reduction, we assume
that the revenues needed to finance this reduction are raised in a non-distortive way, i.e. by a cut
in income transfers. What are the implications of the unilateral reduction in the CIT-rate for the
French economy? We discuss successively the economic changes, the impact on the government
budget and change in welfare.
Table 4.1 Production in Francea
Cost of capital − 1.17
Wage rate 0.53
Incoming transfer price − 7.54
GDP 0.54
Employment 0.13
domestic 0.09
subsidiaries 0.86
Capital 1.33
Inward FDI 5.75
Intermediate inputs 0.53
Pure profits (domestic) 8.23
Debt ratiob − 1.69
a Relative change in response to a 5%-point reduction of the CIT-rate in France.
b Deviation from base path in percentage points.
The tax reduction clearly stimulates production in France: GDP improves by about a half
percent, the capital stock expands by more than 1 percent and an equivalent of 34 thousand jobs
are created. The direct cause of this expansion is the reduction in the cost of capital due to the
15 We have chosen France, because it is a large country, with substantial FDI in at least one other country, namely
Belgium and because the distortiveness of its corporate income tax, as measured by the METR, is near the EU-average.
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tax reduction. This stimulates firms to expand their capital stock as less profitable investments
will now meet the required return. As capital and labour are complementary inputs, a reduction
in the cost of capital will raise the demand not only for capital, but also for labour. Wages
increase to which households respond by substituting leisure for labour. This expansion of
employment together with the larger capital stock are the key determinants of the GDP growth.
Behind the scene, a shift in production towards subsidiaries can be observed: inward FDI
increases much stronger than the average stock of capital and employment in subsidiaries
increases by nearly 1%-point. The FDI-response has two components: nearly 50% of the
response is due to an increase in investments whereas the other part is caused by a shift in
ownership towards equity capital. The first part of the relatively stronger FDI-response is due to
subsidiaries using more intermediate inputs to benefit from transfer pricing. The second part of
the FDI-response, namely the reduction in the debt rate, is due to the impact of the tax cut on the
deductibility of debt: the cost of debt financing increases relative to the cost of equity financing,
which results in a reduction of the debt ratio by 1.7%-points.
We have seen that a single country like France is able to attract FDI by reducing its tax rate.
In addition, it will reduce the profit shifting by French multinationals to other EU countries with
lower tax rates. (Note that France has one of the highest tax rates in the EU – only Germany and
Italy have higher tax rates). The channel for profit shifting in our model is transfer pricing.
French multinationals benefit from the tax cut by charging a higher price for the intermediate
inputs they deliver to their subsidiaries. Of course, foreign multinationals also benefit from the
French tax cut, by charging a lower price to their French subsidiaries. Though the cut in the
incoming transfer price is substantial (−7.5%), the total shift of profit income is limited. It
amounts to 0.12%GDP and generates an increase in tax revenues of only 0.04%GDP.
Profit shifting is only one channel in which the government may recover the reduction in
revenues of 0.41%GDP. A summary of the change in tax revenues and public expenditures is
provided in Table 4.2. Only a tenth of the reduction in tax revenues is regained by a broadening
of the CIT-base. Quantitatively more important is the expansion of the other tax bases, in
particular of the labour tax, summing to nearly two-thirds of the initial revenue loss. The
remaining deficit in the government budget is covered by a reduction in lump-sum transfers to
households of 0.12% GDP.
Why is the broadening of the CIT-base so small? Table 4.2 shows a decomposition of the
tax-base broadening. The first element is the broadening of the base due to an expansion of the
operating surplus which consists of the return to both mobile and location-specific capital
income. The contribution of this term is small given the increase in the capital stock of 1.34%.
However, the expansion of the capital stock is largely offset by the reduction in its gross return:
the reduction in the cost of capital is matched by a similar reduction in the marginal productivity
of capital. The second part of the tax base contributing to additional revenues is the deduction of
less interest payments. Firms reduce their debt ratio as the tax-rate reduction makes
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Table 4.2 Government revenues and expenditures in Francea
Revenues
CIT-tax (ex ante) − 0.41
Tax base expansionb 0.04
Of which gross operating surplus 0.02
change in debt ratio 0.08
value of depreciation allowances − 0.08
profit shifting 0.04
CIT-tax (ex post) − 0.37
Labour tax 0.17
Consumption tax 0.05
Wealth taxes 0.03
Total tax revenues − 0.12
Expenditures
Transfers (to old) − 0.12
Government consumptionb 0.00
Total expenditures − 0.12
a Change in %GDP in response to a 5%-point reduction of the CIT-rate in France.
b The tax base of a country j is (loosely) defined as (see Bettendorf and Van der Horst (2006) for the precise definition):
Π̂( j) =
[
Y −∑
i 6= j
q( j, i)−wL
]
−db rˆwbK− δt D+∑
i 6= j
[
(pq (i, j)−1)q(i, j)+(1− pq ( j, i))q( j, i)
]
where the first term denotes the gross operating surplus, the second refers to the deductibility of debt, the third are the depreciation
allowances and the final term indicates profit shifting.
equity-financing relatively cheaper. Thirdly, the expansion of the capital stock increases the
depreciation allowances, which tempers the broadening of the tax base. The final element of the
tax base is profit shifting. However, for a large country like France, with a limited share of
production by multinationals (as measured by the share of FDI in GDP), the scope for profit
shifting is limited: less than 10% of the CIT-reduction is recovered by the shift in profits towards
France.
Households in France benefit from the increase in their labour income and from a higher
return to their location specific capital, but face a reduction in the transfers they receive from the
government. The net effect is an expansion of their lifetime income which induces an expansion
in consumption of about 0.4% in both periods. Savings increase as the income expansion is
concentrated in the first period (labour income). The increase in savings is, however, smaller
than the increase in investment which implies a worsening of the net foreign asset position of
France of about 5%GDP.
The reform where the tax on corporate income tax is financed with a reduction in lump-sum
transfers raises welfare, see Table 4.3. The welfare gain is equivalent to an increase in transfers
of 0.21% GDP, which is about 50% of the initial impulse.16 The welfare gain is due to the
16 We evaluate a welfare gain in money-terms by calculating the change in lump-sum transfers to households which would
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Table 4.3 Consumption and welfare in Francea
Consumption (young) 0.45
Consumption (old) 0.42
Savings 0.95
Net foreign assets (% GDP)b − 4.93
Welfare (% GDP)b 0.22
a Relative change in response to a 5%-point reduction of the CIT-rate in France.
b Deviation from base path in percentage points.
attraction of foreign profit income, the increase in foreign direct investment and the reduction of
investment distortions of both domestic and multinational firms. At this moment, we cannot
conclude which source has the largest contribution to welfare. The next section, where we
investigate alternative means of financing the CIT-reduction will shed light on this.
4.1.2 Alternative financing
The previous section clearly shows the benefits of a reduction of the corporate income tax rate.
The reliance on transfers to close the budget is, however, unrealistic. Lump-sum taxes (like the
British poll tax) or lump-sum transfers are quite rare. More realistically is that a reduction in the
CIT-rate has to be financed with either a cut in government expenditures or a reduction in
alternative tax rates, like the taxes on labour or consumption.
To investigate these – more realistic – scenarios, we consider the same unilateral reduction of
the French CIT-rate, but now the budget is closed with changes in the tax rates on labour or
consumption. Table 4.4 shows the impact on the revenues of the government, where the first
column repeats the transfer-financed CIT-reduction of the previous subsection. The first
indication of the distortiveness of the labour and consumption taxes is the required increase in
tax revenues. An increase in labour tax revenues of 0.33%GDP or an increase in consumption
tax revenues of 0.22%GDP is required instead of a reduction in transfers of 0.12%GDP in the
first scenario.
Perhaps surprisingly, the broadening of the CIT-base is hardly affected by the financing rule.
The clue to this neutrality result is that several elements of the tax base, in particular transfer
pricing and the change in the debt ratio, depend on the CIT-rate only. In addition, the changes in
the gross operating surplus and in the depreciation allowances depend crucially on the capital
stock, but largely offset each other. As a result, the expansion of the CIT-base recovers only a
small fraction of the lost revenues irrespective of the financing rule.
How do the alternative tax reforms affect the economic and welfare responses? Table 4.5
summarises the key effects of the three tax reforms. First, both the higher tax on consumption
generate an equivalent change in welfare. To allow for comparison across countries we express this transfer as a
percentage of GDP.
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Table 4.4 Government revenues and expenditures in France under alternative sources of financinga
Transfers Labour tax Consumption tax
Financing instrumentb − 0.12 0.66 0.53
Revenues
CIT-tax (ex ante) − 0.41 − 0.41 − 0.41
Tax base expansionc 0.04 0.03 0.04
Of which gross operating surplus 0.02 − 0.03 0.00
change in debt ratio 0.08 0.08 0.08
value of depreciation allowances − 0.08 − 0.06 − 0.07
profit shifting 0.04 0.03 0.03
CIT-tax (ex post) − 0.37 − 0.38 − 0.37
Labour tax 0.17 0.50 0.12
Consumption tax 0.05 − 0.04 0.27
Wealth taxes 0.03 − 0.09 − 0.02
Total tax revenues − 0.12 0.00 0.00
Total expenditures − 0.12 0.00 0.00
a Change in %GDP in response to a 5%-point reduction of the CIT-rate in France.
b Change in transfers as %GDP (first column) or percentage-point change in tax rates (second & third column).
c See note b in Table 4.2.
and in particular on labour reverse the effect on employment. For the labour tax this is obvious
as a tax on capital income is replaced by a tax on labour income, which likely boosts capital and
reduces employment via a reduction in the supply of labour. The higher consumption tax also
reduces the supply of labour as it induces a shift from the consumption of goods towards the
consumption of leisure.
Secondly, Table 4.5 shows that the reductions in employment are mimicked by similar
reductions in the capital stock and production. In other words, neither the capital-labour ratio nor
labour productivity are significantly affected by the financing rule, which implies that the change
in the wage rate is quite similar in the three tax reforms. Only the cost of capital, which is
independent of the labour and consumption tax rates, determine the amount of capital and
production per unit of labour.17 For similar reasons, neither the change in labour productivity
nor the pure profits per labour hour are affected by the financing rule. The implication of this is
that neither the labour tax nor the consumption tax distort the investment and production
decisions of firms.
Third, the closure rule does not affect transfer pricing nor the choice between debt and equity
capital. Both depend only on the statutory CIT-rates.
17 The slight change in the wage rate, which mimics similar differences in the responses of the capital-labour ratio and
labour productivity, are due to the fixed factor, namely location specific capital, in the production function. As a result, the
production function exhibits decreasing returns to the accumulable production factors.
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Table 4.5 Economic and welfare effects in France of alternative tax reforms
Production side Transfers Labour tax Consumption tax
GDP 0.54 0.11 0.37
Employment 0.13 − 0.32 − 0.05
domestic 0.09 − 0.37 − 0.09
subsidiaries 0.86 0.45 0.70
Capital 1.33 0.89 1.16
Inward FDI 5.75 5.33 5.58
Intermediate inputs 0.53 0.55 0.54
Pure profits (domestic) 8.23 7.76 8.05
Wage rate 0.53 0.55 0.54
Cost of capital − 1.17 − 1.17 − 1.17
Debt ratioa − 1.69 − 1.69 − 1.69
Incoming transfer price − 7.54 − 7.54 − 7.54
Consumption side
Consumption (young) 0.45 − 0.35 0.13
Consumption (old) 0.42 − 0.26 0.14
Savings 0.95 − 2.69 − 0.70
Welfare (% GDP)a 0.22 − 0.07 0.10
a Deviation from base path in percentage points.
Fourth, the realistic reliance on the labour or consumption tax significantly affects consumption:
the consumption expansion disappears like snow in summer (with a higher consumption tax rate)
or even turns into a decline (with labour-tax financing). In both cases, the labour/leisure choice
is distorted, resulting in a higher demand for leisure at the expense of the demand for
consumption goods.
This distortion of the labour/leisure decision reduces the welfare gain of the CIT-reduction.
With labour-tax financing, the aggravated distortion in the labour supply decision dominates the
alleviation of the corporate income distortions as indicated by the welfare loss of 0.07%GDP.
The tax reform where the reduction in the CIT-rate is compensated by a higher consumption tax
is still beneficial in France as indicated by the welfare gain of 0.10%GDP. These welfare gains
imply a ranking of tax distortions in France (at the current tax rates): the consumption tax is least
distortive, the labour tax is highly distortive and the CIT is in between.18 In contrast to the
labour tax does the consumption tax not only bear on the working-age population, but also
makes consumption for the retired workers more expensive. Their income does not only consist
of delayed labour income, but also includes profit income and transfers. These income sources
cannot be influenced by workers, and taxing them is therefore non-distortive.
18 The observation that the alternative source of financing matters is in line with Mendoza and Tesar (2005). In contrast,
Copenhagen Economics (2004, p. 26) observe hardly any difference between financing with transfers or with labour tax
rates in a simulation of tax-base and tax-rate harmonisation. They point at the inelasticity of labour supply to explain their
results.
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Therefore, the desirability of a CIT-reduction in France depends significantly on how the
domestic distortions in the economy are aggravated by the alternative means of financing the
government expenditures, as discussed in section 2.2.
4.1.3 Spillovers to other EU countries
Tax competition is about countries affecting each other. In section 2.3.1 we pointed at the
positive spillovers, like profit shifting, where a tax reduction in one country hurts other countries.
However, a tax reduction may also benefit other countries (a negative spillover) if fewer taxes are
exported, see section 2.3.2. In this section we investigate how other member states benefit or
lose from a tax rate reduction in France. In this section, we investigate a tax reform where both
France and all other member states close their government budgets with endogenous changes in
the labour-tax rate.19 To start, Table 4.6 shows how other countries are directly affected by a tax
reform in France.
Table 4.6 How France affects the rest of the EU – on average and in a selection of countries
Rest EU BLU GRC NLD GBR HUN
CIT-rate 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.18
Profit shiftinga − 0.24 − 1.43 − 0.04 − 0.46 − 0.39 − 0.04
Tax exportationa 0.04 0.41 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.00
FDI (in)b 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.06 − 0.30 − 0.47
FDI (out)b 0.74 0.78 0.51 0.66 0.61 − 0.15
a Percentage change relative to CIT-base in the EU (minus FRA) respectively BLU.
b Percentage change relative to inward or outward FDI in the EU (minus FRA) respectively BLU.
Consider first the negative spillover where the rest of the EU benefits from the reduction in tax
exportation as profit income from France towards the non-French owners of location-specific
capital is taxed less. Of course, countries with significant interests in the French economy, like
Belgium & Luxembourg and the Netherlands, benefit most from this reduction in the tax on
profit income.
Second, this effect on foreign ownership is counteracted by the positive spillover of profit
shifting which declines for all EU-countries (except France of course) as France becomes a
relatively more attractive country to report profits. For high-tax countries this implies an
aggravation of the loss in CIT-revenues, whereas low-tax countries benefit less from their
tax-rate advantage. Observe that the relative change in profit shifting varies strongly across
countries. This variation is linked to the bilateral FDI of each country with France. If bilateral
FDI is very small, as in the case of Greece and Hungary, very few multinationals are able to
benefit from the tax differential from their home country with France. In these cases, the scope
19 How the budget is closed hardly matters for the points we make in this subsection. Alternative closing rules are
therefore not shown in this section.
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for profit shifting is limited. The reverse holds of course for profit shifting between Belgium and
France, where there are many multinationals able to exploit the tax differential.
Third, for all countries the change in their outgoing FDI (towards France) exceeds the
incoming FDI (from France). Outgoing FDI represents the additional investments by non-French
multinationals in France, benefiting from the lower tax rate. Incoming FDI (in the other
EU-countries) does hardly change on average, as the first column shows, but increases in
countries with high tax rates and declines in countries with low tax rates. What causes the
variation in FDI-responses between countries, where FDI is intensified between France and most
other countries, but reduced between France and Hungary? To start with the latter, why do
French multinationals cut their FDI in Hungary, and why do Hungarian multinationals even
reduce their FDI in France? The reason is the link between FDI and transfer pricing. Transfer
pricing has both a price and a volume component: not only the price per unit of intermediate
input matters, but also the amount of intermediates determine the value of profits shifted
between countries. As France cuts its tax rate, the reasons to shift profits towards low tax
countries, like Hungary, diminishes. In the first place, this induces a dampening of the transfer
prices (i.e. they come closer to the unit price). In addition, profit shifting towards Hungary is
dampened by a reduction in the volume of intermediate deliveries from French multinationals to
their Hungarian subsidiaries and vice versa. As intermediates and capital are complementary, the
amount of FDI in Hungary diminishes too.
The same connection between FDI and intermediate inputs also explains part of the
improvement in FDI between France and say the Netherlands. But the distinction between
inward and outward FDI points at another element playing a role. As the tax on corporate
income in France declines, investment in that country becomes more attractive, not only for
French firms, but also for foreign firms with French subsidiaries. Dutch multinationals therefore
respond to the French tax reduction by intensifying their foreign investments (in France).
Figure 4.1 Reduction in tax revenues in other countries have to be compensated with higher labour tax ratesa
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a Left panel shows the impact of the CIT reduction in France on the CIT revenues (in %GDP) in the other member states; right panel
shows the required %-point change in the labour tax rate.
What do these spillovers imply for the European economies and for welfare? Figure 4.1 shows
that the tax reform in France affects the CIT-revenues in the other member states negatively as
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profits are shifted away. This reduction in revenues has to be compensated by an increase in the
labour tax rate, where the figure clearly shows that a relatively large loss of tax revenues has to
be compensated by a relatively large increase in the labour-tax rate. However, even for Belgium
& Luxembourg, which are most severely hit by the French tax cut, a modest change in the labour
tax rate of 0.13%-point suffices to recover the loss in tax revenues.
Figure 4.2 Production and welfare decline in rest of the EUa
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Change in GDP (%) and welfare (%GDP) in the other member states in response to the CIT reduction in France.
The higher tax on labour is in turn harmful for employment, investment and GDP, where the
latter is shown in Figure 4.2. The relation between the tax change and the GDP-effect is clear: a
larger tax increase induces the largest reduction in GDP, up to 0.14% in BLU.
The reduction in GDP announces a reduction in welfare, implying that a CIT-reduction in
France negatively affects the other member states. Countries with many subsidiaries in France
(or with many subsidiaries from French multinationals), like Belgium/Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom are most severely hit by the tax-reform in France. In
addition, countries like Sweden with a highly distortive labour tax suffer heavily from the
required increase in the labour-tax rate.
The reduction in both production and welfare shows that the impact of profit shifting towards
France, which harms other member states, dominates the impact of the diminished tax export.
Tax reforms in which a country unilaterally reduces its CIT-rate is therefore a
beggar-thy-neighbour policy, albeit a modest one.
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4.2 Unilateral reduction of the CIT-rate, country by country
We now broaden the analysis to the other countries. Do the main observations for France extend
to the other member states? Consider that each country reduces its CIT-rate unilaterally with
5%-points, and finances this with a change in the labour tax rate, which is the single most
important source of government revenues in the EU. Table 4.7 summarises the implications for
the economy and for welfare in each country.
Table 4.7 Unilateral tax reforms with 5%-point CIT-reduction and labour-tax financing
Tax rates and revenues Economic effects Welfare
Countrya METR METR CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV CVEU
(b) (a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (y) (y) (yEU )
AUT 0.06 − 1.08 − 0.22 0.45 0.93 0.20 6.42 − 0.03 − 0.002
BLU 0.08 − 1.44 − 0.19 0.14 1.50 0.75 6.52 0.23 − 0.011
DNK 0.06 − 1.20 − 0.26 0.69 1.02 0.22 5.54 − 0.09 − 0.002
FIN 0.08 − 1.60 − 0.34 0.67 1.68 0.52 5.91 0.07 − 0.002
FRA 0.07 − 1.11 − 0.25 0.66 0.89 0.11 5.33 − 0.07 − 0.013
DEU 0.12 − 1.99 − 0.35 0.61 2.24 0.68 5.48 0.21 − 0.017
GRC − 0.01 0.36 − 0.03 0.32 − 0.55 − 0.28 5.32 − 0.18 0.000
IRL 0.03 − 1.42 − 0.54 1.10 1.53 0.78 10.10 − 0.10 − 0.003
ITA 0.02 − 0.23 − 0.08 0.44 − 0.03 − 0.18 3.26 − 0.10 − 0.005
NLD 0.10 − 1.66 − 0.24 0.22 1.76 0.65 5.00 0.30 − 0.013
PRT 0.05 − 0.89 − 0.11 0.37 0.73 0.15 5.48 − 0.02 − 0.001
ESP 0.06 − 1.06 − 0.21 0.66 0.99 0.23 5.79 − 0.01 − 0.003
SWE 0.05 − 0.98 − 0.21 0.62 0.68 0.08 5.96 − 0.19 − 0.004
GBR 0.08 − 1.61 − 0.26 0.53 1.49 0.35 6.83 0.05 − 0.022
CZE 0.06 − 1.22 − 0.19 0.75 1.31 0.43 6.84 − 0.02 − 0.001
HUN 0.05 − 1.53 − 0.20 0.84 1.57 0.48 9.34 − 0.05 − 0.001
POL 0.05 − 1.48 − 0.14 0.73 1.41 0.36 9.03 − 0.04 − 0.002
Corrb 0.81 − 0.64 − 0.23 − 0.45 0.69 0.70 − 0.13 − 0.58
a METR: marginal effective tax rate (its base value (b) and its absolute change (a)); CIT: change in CIT-revenues (in %GDP of home
country); τl : change in labour tax rate; K: relative change (r) in capital stock; GDP: relative change in gross domestic product; FDI (in):
change in inward FDI; CV: change in welfare in home country, CV, and in the rest of the EU, CVEU , (in %GDP of EU).
b Correlation of each variable with the change in welfare.
4.2.1 Common elements
Consider first the common elements in the economic responses to the unilateral tax reforms.
First, CIT-revenues decline in all countries and have to be compensated with an increase in the
labour-tax rate. Second, the reduction in the CIT-rate stimulates investment in nearly all
countries. Very clearly, investment is depressed significantly in countries with a distortive tax on
corporate income and is therefore highly stimulated by the tax relief. Third, higher investments
boost production, just as a reduction in GDP is caused by a lower investment level. Fourthly,
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inward investment grows in all countries, even in countries with a negative effect on total
investments. Behind the scene, capital is shifted from domestic firms and multinational
headquarters towards foreign-owned subsidiaries. In addition, the tax reduction induces a shift
from debt-capital towards equity capital.
4.2.2 Variation between countries
Besides the similarities, the large variation between countries strikes the eye. Production is
stimulated in most countries, but not in all. Some countries gain (in terms of welfare) from an
unilateral tax reform, others lose. Figure 4.3 provides the key explanation for the variation in
results: it is due to the variation in the distortiveness of the corporate income tax as measured by
the marginal effective tax rate (METR).
Figure 4.3 The welfare change (%GDP) depends on the initial tax distortion
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For countries with a small CIT-base, like Greece and Italy, a reduction in the tax rate hardly
reduces the distortions in the investment decision, but the implied increase in the labour tax rate
aggravates the labour-supply distortion. For these countries, both welfare and GDP decline. In
contrast, countries with a highly distortive tax on corporate income, like Germany and the
Netherlands, the partial replacement of the CIT with a tax on labour improves both production
and welfare.20
20 At both extremes, GDP and welfare point in the same direction. For many countries, however, the small increase in
production is insufficient to generate a welfare gain.
41
The comparison between countries reveals some interesting additional observations. First, Spain
and Sweden face the same reduction in CIT-revenues and a similar increase in the labour-tax
rate. Despite the similarity in impulses, Sweden faces a significant welfare loss, unlike Spain.
The reason is the difference in distortiveness of the labour income tax, which is much higher in
Sweden (with an initial average tax rate τl of 0.47) than in Spain (where τl = 0.28).
Second, the effective tax rate on marginal investments (the METR) is determined by the tax
rate and the tax base. Ireland and Italy have similar METRs, but the first combines a broad tax
base with a low rate whereas the opposite holds for Italy. This matters significantly for the
economic effects of a reduction in the tax rate: it induces a much stronger reduction in the cost
of capital, but also takes much more tax revenues in Ireland. In terms of welfare both effects
cancel out: the reduction in the cost of capital stimulates investment, employment and GDP, but
the required strong increase in the labour-tax rate distorts the labour-supply decision and turns
the welfare gain into a loss.
Thirdly, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have similarly distortive CIT-systems (as
measured by the METR in the base) and even the change in the marginal effective tax rate and
the reduction of tax revenues are similar. Nevertheless, the required increase in the labour-tax
rate is much larger in GBR than in NLD, implying a much larger welfare gain in the latter
country. The difference in profit shifting, which is related to the share of FDI in each country,
can explain this difference. Profit-shifting raises tax revenues in the Netherlands by 0.11%GDP
against only 0.03%GDP in the UK. Economies hosting many multinationals (both parents and
subsidiaries) have therefore stronger incentives to reduce their tax rate on corporate income.
4.2.3 Spillovers
In section 4.1.3, we have pointed at the negative consequences of a unilateral CIT-reduction in
France for the other member states. The final column in Table 4.7 shows that this observation
translates to other countries: very robust, but limited in size, are the negative spillovers towards
other countries. The fact that these numbers are very small, however, strikes the eyes. One
reason is that we measure the impact of a change in the tax-rate in one country for welfare in the
whole European Union. So the foreign effects are being spread over a large number of countries.
Alternatively, these small figures might also be due to the limited size of the spillovers. In order
to investigate the relative size of the international linkages, we express both the domestic and the
sum of the foreign welfare effects as fraction of the reduction in CIT-revenues (in the home
country).
Figure 4.4 shows the domestic and foreign welfare effects (in Euro) of each Euro reduction
in the CIT-rate. For France, for example, a reduction in ex-ante CIT-revenues of 1 Euro,
compensated with an increase in the labour-tax rate, reduces welfare by 20 cents in both France
and in the rest of the EU. In Germany, the welfare gain at home of about 40 cents goes at the
expense of a 10 cents reduction in the rest of the EU. Clearly, the foreign effects are sizable, and
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Figure 4.4 Spillovers are substantial, but are spread over many countriesa
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a Welfare change in home country and in rest of the EU of unilateral reductions in the CIT-rate, expressed as fraction of the initial (or ex
ante) reduction in CIT-revenues.
in many cases comparable to the domestic effects. However, when spread over many (16)
countries, the welfare effects per country are quite limited.
4.2.4 Alternative financing matters
Of course, the welfare effects are more favourable with a tax reform with indirect taxation to
close the budget, let alone with transfer-financing, see Figure 4.5. When financed with the labour
tax, we have seen that only 5 countries have an incentive to reduce their CIT-rate. Would,
however, countries be able to raise their tax on consumption expenditures, reducing the CIT-rate
is welfare improving for all but two countries. Where does this difference come from?
The key to understand the difference is the choice households make between labour and
leisure. Both the labour income tax and the consumption tax affect this choice: a higher labour
tax makes leisure relatively more attractive than employment, whereas a higher consumption tax
induces a substitution from consumption towards leisure. However, as consumption is partly
financed by income from non-labour income, the tax on consumption is less distortive that the
labour tax, see section 4.1.2.
Even more attractive is, of course, the switch from corporate income taxation to transfers.
The welfare gains from this – practically infeasible – reform are substantial. Compared with the
ex ante reduction in CIT-revenues, the welfare gains range from 25% in Italy to 80% in the
Netherlands (with the exception of Greece, facing a welfare reduction even with transfer
financing).
43
Figure 4.5 Gains from tax reform depends on alternative sources of financinga
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a Welfare change (%GDP) of unilateral reductions in the CIT-rate financed with income transfers, consumption tax or labour tax.
To sum up, a race to the bottom is unlikely with labour-tax financing, but much more likely
when the consumption tax can be applied. If countries have an incentive to reduce their tax rate,
does this result in a race to the bottom, i.e. to the complete abandoning of the corporate income
tax? Figure 4.6 reveals that the answer is certainly: no! The figures show the actual and optimal
CIT-rates. Optimal CIT-rates are calculated under the assumptions that the loss of CIT-revenues
have to be financed with a change in either the labour tax rate or the tax rate on consumption and
other countries do not respond. In all countries and for both financing rules, it is optimal to
maintain the corporate income tax. To summarise, no single country has an incentive to abandon
unilaterally its tax on corporate income. This conclusion holds, however, under the assumption
that other countries do not respond. The next section investigates whether strategic underbidding
would result in zero tax rates.
4.3 Optimal response to tax cuts in other countries
At current levels of taxation, a reduction in CIT rates is optimal for most, but not for all
countries. Very likely, however, tax reductions in one country, or in a couple of countries, will
not remain unanswered. Is it optimal for countries to underbid each others tax rates, thus
participating in a race to the bottom?
Ideally, we would investigate this question by considering the strategic behaviour of all
countries responding to all others. The size of this problem is huge, however, as 17 asymmetric
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Figure 4.6 Corporate income taxes should not be abandoned, but in some countries even increaseda
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a Actual and optimal CIT-rates, with labour-tax and consumption-tax financing.
countries have to respond optimally to 16 other member states. We can still investigate the
likeliness of a race to the bottom by simplifying the analysis to the optimal response of each
country to tax cuts in all other countries. Suppose that all countries except one (say France)
reduce their tax rates in steps of 10%, starting from the current tax rates and ending in a situation
where all but France have abandoned their tax on corporate income. How should France
optimally response to the tax cuts in the other member states? Table 4.8 shows the optimal
response of France and for the other countries in similar experiments.21
The second column of Table 4.8 repeats Figure 4.6 showing the optimal tax rate of each
country if all other countries stick to their current tax rates. The third to sixth column show how
this optimal tax rate changes if other countries cut their tax rates. Very clearly, countries should
be reluctant to follow other countries in cutting their tax rate. Each individual country will only
reduce its tax rate with 0-3%-point if the rest of Europe reduces its CIT-rates with 10%-point.
Even if all other countries abandon their tax on corporate income (see last column), it is optimal
for each individual country to retain its CIT. According to our simulations, countries would set
their tax rate between 14% in the Netherlands and 40% in Greece.
As before, the main reason to tax corporate income is that the alternative of taxing labour is
even more distortive. Profit shifting is on the other side of the balance: harmful tax reductions by
other countries can be coped with a tax cut at home. The dominance of the first implies that no
single country gains from abandoning its tax on corporate income.
21 How would country i optimally set its tax rate if all other countries j 6= i reduce their rate in steps of 10%-point?
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Table 4.8 Optimal response to tax cuts in other countriesa
Current tax rate Optimal tax rate Optimal response if other countries cut their tax rates with:
10% 20% 30% 40%
AUT 0.34 0.33 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.04 − 0.06
BLU 0.34 0.22 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.03 − 0.05
DNK 0.30 0.30 − 0.03 − 0.04 − 0.07 − 0.08
FIN 0.29 0.24 − 0.01 − 0.03 − 0.05 − 0.06
FRA 0.35 0.36 − 0.02 − 0.04 − 0.07 − 0.08
DEU 0.40 0.27 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.03 − 0.04
GRC 0.35 0.44 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.04 − 0.04
IRL 0.13 0.17 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.02
ITA 0.38 0.40 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.05 − 0.06
NLD 0.35 0.21 − 0.01 − 0.04 − 0.06 − 0.07
PRT 0.33 0.33 − 0.01 − 0.03 − 0.05 − 0.06
ESP 0.35 0.33 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.03
SWE 0.28 0.31 − 0.02 − 0.05 − 0.08 − 0.09
GBR 0.30 0.23 0.00 − 0.02 − 0.03 − 0.05
CZE 0.28 0.27 0.00 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.01
HUN 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.01
POL 0.19 0.22 0.00 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.01
a The optimal response to the tax reductions in the other countries is given in deviation of the optimal tax rate at current levels of taxation
(given in the second column).
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5 Multilateral and coordinated changes in the corporate
income tax rate
When a country reduces its tax rate, other countries may respond by reducing their tax rates too.
In this section, we investigate the economic and welfare effects of multilateral and coordinated
changes in the CIT-rate.
5.1 Multilateral reduction
Suppose that all countries simultaneously reduce their corporate income tax rate with 5%-point.
For each country, we compare the economic and welfare effects of this multilateral tax reform
with the unilateral reduction of the tax rate. Very likely, the potential gains from a reduction of
the CIT rate, like favourable profit shifting and the inflow of foreign direct investment, will
diminish. We start the comparison of the multilateral and unilateral tax reforms, summarised in
Tables 5.1 respectively 4.7, with the international linkages. In both reforms, governments close
their budgets by adjusting their labour tax rate.
Table 5.1 Multilateral tax reform with 5%-point CIT-reduction and labour-tax financing
Tax rates and revenues Economic effects Welfare
Countrya METR METR CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV
(b) (a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (y) (y)
AUT 6.21 − 1.08 − 0.25 0.56 0.87 0.07 3.64 − 0.09
BLU 7.99 − 1.44 − 0.30 0.70 1.20 0.10 5.40 − 0.15
DNK 6.30 − 1.20 − 0.30 1.00 0.87 − 0.03 3.71 − 0.28
FIN 8.06 − 1.60 − 0.37 0.88 1.57 0.35 4.74 − 0.04
FRA 6.51 − 1.11 − 0.27 0.80 0.81 − 0.01 4.35 − 0.15
DEU 12.40 − 1.99 − 0.37 0.72 2.19 0.59 6.94 0.15
GRC − 0.76 0.36 − 0.03 0.34 − 0.55 − 0.30 4.37 − 0.19
IRL 3.38 − 1.42 − 0.56 1.29 1.41 0.31 2.81 − 0.22
ITA 2.21 − 0.23 − 0.09 0.49 − 0.06 − 0.22 3.31 − 0.13
NLD 9.63 − 1.66 − 0.34 0.64 1.56 0.30 4.06 0.07
PRT 5.10 − 0.89 − 0.13 0.43 0.71 0.05 3.72 − 0.07
ESP 6.20 − 1.06 − 0.22 0.69 0.98 0.18 4.59 − 0.03
SWE 4.91 − 0.98 − 0.25 0.96 0.46 − 0.26 3.25 − 0.41
GBR 8.35 − 1.61 − 0.29 0.65 1.43 0.20 3.68 − 0.02
CZE 6.10 − 1.22 − 0.20 0.79 1.28 0.36 2.17 − 0.05
HUN 5.05 − 1.53 − 0.20 0.89 1.51 0.37 0.36 − 0.09
POL 5.18 − 1.48 − 0.14 0.76 1.38 0.29 1.20 − 0.06
Corrb 0.60 − 0.45 − 0.07 − 0.36 0.59 0.72 0.27
Corrc − 0.85 − 0.52 0.15 0.83 0.68 0.46 0.60
a See Table 4.7 for explanation of the symbols.
b Correlation of each variable with the change in welfare.
c Correlation of each variable with the METR in the base case.
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Both inward and outward FDI are affected by the accompanying reduction in CIT-rates in the
other member states. Each country is less able to attract FDI if other countries take part in the
tax reform. On the other hand, outward FDI increases as multinationals residing in each country
benefit from the tax reductions in all other countries by raising the capital stock of their
subsidiaries.22 Secondly, the fact that all countries reduce their CIT-rate simultaneously implies
that the scope for profit shifting diminishes significantly: countries are no longer able to benefit
from a change in the tax gap with other countries. Transfer prices are set closer to the real price
since the costs associated with transfer prices are now deducted at a lower CIT rate. Stated
differently, a given tax differential (of say 10%-point) induces more profit shifting between two
high-tax countries than between two low-tax countries. The third international linkage, namely
tax export, will in contrast be enforced by a multilateral reduction of CIT-rates as each country
will benefit from the increase in the net return on location specific capital in all other
EU-countries.
Figure 5.1 Countries benefit less from a multilateral tax reform; implications for tax revenues (left panel) and
GDP (right panel)a
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a All reforms consists of a 5%-point reduction in the CIT-rate financed with an endogenous change in the labour-tax rate. The unilateral
changes in CIT-revenues (left panel) and GDP (right panel) correspond with Table 4.7; the multilateral changes are taken from Table 5.1.
b The x-axis shows the change in CIT-revenues respectively GDP under unilateral reductions of the CIT-rates. The y-axis shows the
corresponding changes in the multilateral simulation.
The reduction in profit shifting and the intensification of tax exporting materialise in diminished
broadening of tax bases, implying larger reductions in CIT-revenues. This is shown in the left
panel of Figure 5.1, which plots changes in CIT-revenues from unilateral (on the x-axis) against
multilateral reforms (on the y-axis). As all countries are situated below the 45◦-line, the figure
clearly show that all countries lose in terms of tax revenues if their own CIT-reduction is
accompanied with similar tax reforms in other countries.
22 Outward FDI is not included in Table 5.1, but is similar to inward FDI; on average it exactly equals inward FDI. In the
unilateral simulations of Table 4.7, outward FDI is much smaller than inward FDI, as the inward FDI of a single country has
to be met by the outward FDI of all other EU countries.
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How do these spillovers determine the economic responses to a multilateral compared to
unilateral reductions of CIT-rates? First, the reductions in CIT-revenues ask for an additional
increase in the labour-tax rates. This induces a stronger reduction (or smaller increase) in
employment, investment and GDP. The latter is shown in the right panel of Figure 5.1, where the
location below the 45◦-line implies that the stimulus to GDP is weakened if other member states
follow a countries’ reduction in its CIT-rate. For many countries, the accompanying reduction of
CIT-rates by other countries hardly matters. These are the countries with limited international
linkages. The small and open economies, like Ireland, the Benelux and the Scandinavian
countries, are all situated towards the bottom-right of both figures indicating a significant
reduction in CIT-revenues and GDP in a multilateral tax reform (compared to unilateral
reforms). These countries were able to benefit significantly from profit shifting if other countries
do not respond to their tax reform – a benefit which disappears however in a multilateral setting.
Second, the differences between both scenarios cannot be explained by differences in marginal
investment decisions, as the changes in the METR are equivalent in both scenarios.
Figure 5.2 Most countries do not benefit from a multilateral tax reductiona
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a Welfare effect (%GDP) of multilateral and unilateral reductions in the CIT-rate; government budgets are closed with changes in the
labour-tax rate.
How do these effects on tax revenues and GDP translate to welfare? Figure 5.2 shows that a
multilateral reduction in CIT-rates is less beneficial (or more harmful) than an unilateral tax
reform. Welfare losses of all countries are aggravated and only two countries, namely Germany
and the Netherlands, benefit from an EU-wide reduction of the CIT-rate. Only in these countries,
the labour tax is less distortive that the corporate income tax, at current tax rates. Which
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countries are most strongly hit if their policy is followed by other countries? In the first place,
countries with many multinationals – as indicated by a large share of gross FDI in GDP – benefit
most from an unilateral reduction. For example, the welfare gain from an unilateral reduction in
Belgium/Luxembourg turns into a loss if other countries follow their policy. For the Netherlands,
welfare still improves but by only a third of the unilateral welfare gain. Secondly, countries with
a highly distortive labour tax, like Sweden, face a very strong reduction in welfare in a
multilateral tax reform as its required change in its already high labour-tax rate rises from 0.6 to
1.0%-point.
5.2 Indirect tax export
Until now we have assumed that European member states, and even the EU as a whole, are small
players on the world capital markets, such that the impact of tax policies on the world return on
assets is negligible. For individual member states this assumption is quite reasonable, but a
multilateral reduction in the corporate income tax might affect the rate of return on bonds and
equity. How might world capital markets respond to European tax changes and how does this
affect the European economies?
Table 5.2 World capital markets – in response to a multilateral reduction in CIT-ratesa
Bonds Equity
Supply of capital − 4.3 − 1.8
Demand for capital − 3.7 6.0
Net demand 0.6 7.8
Rate of returnb 0.6 7.7
a Deviation from base path in percentage points.
b Change in rate of return in base points.
Based on empirical evidence surveyed by European Commission (2004, p. 155), we assume that
an increase in the net supply of capital goods in the EU of 1%GDP reduces the world return on
bonds and equity by 1 base point. This begs the question by how much the demand and supply
of capital in terms of bonds and equity change in response to a multilateral 5%-point reduction
in CIT-rates. Table 5.2 shows the changes in the supply by households and the demand by firms
and government (only bonds) and the corresponding changes in the rates of return on both assets.
Most remarkable is the different change in firms’ debt and equity. This is due to the different
treatment of debt and equity-financing by the corporate income tax. Debt costs are subtracted
from the corporate tax base unlike returns on equity. A reduction in the tax rate therefore
increases the cost of debt-financed capital. The CIT-reduction therefore increases the total
demand for capital and induces a shift from bonds to equity. On the supply side, aggregate
savings decline as income declines in the first period due to the higher labour tax and increases in
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the retirement period due to the lower tax on the return to location specific capital. The reduction
is biased towards bonds, because the largest share of wealth (about two-thirds) is held in bonds.
The capital shortage in Europe raises the interest rate on equity and bonds by 8 respectively 1
base point, reflecting the stronger imbalance in the supply- and demand effects on equity. This
does not only increase net savings in the rest of the world, but raises savings and reduces
investments in Europe too. This is shown in Table 5.3, which summarises the economic and
welfare changes for Europe of the tax reform with fixed and endogenous rates of return.
Table 5.3 Multilateral reduction in CIT-rates, with fixed and endogenous rates of returna
Fixed return Endogenous return
Labour tax rate 0.69 0.70
Cost of capital − 1.37 − 0.90
Wage 0.60 0.40
Gross domestic product 0.17 0.01
Employment − 0.24 − 0.26
Capital 1.12 0.64
FDI (inward) 4.34 3.13
Debt ratioa − 1.66 − 1.32
Consumption (young) − 0.25 − 0.45
Consumption (old) − 0.18 0.07
Savings − 1.97 − 1.77
Welfare (%GDP) − 0.04 − 0.09
a Deviation from base path (which is the same in both scenarios) in percentage points.
The limited increase in the capital stock significantly affects GDP: the small increase in GDP in
the simulation with fixed interest rates disappears altogether. The change in employment is,
however, hardly affected by the change in interest rates. On the one hand, households substitute
consumption of both goods and leisure (when young) for consumption in their old age. On the
other hand, consumption in both periods and leisure are smaller due to a reduction in the
after-tax wage rate. Both effects on leisure, and therefore on the supply of labour, cancel out.
The higher rate of return on equity induces a shift from equity- to debt-financed capital, as
shown by the smaller reduction of the debt ratio. Together with the smaller growth of real
investments, this implies a strong reduction in the FDI-response.
The increase in the rate of the return is harmful for Europe as it aggravates, on average, the
welfare loss of a labour-tax financed reduction in the CIT-rate. This welfare loss has two main
causes. The first cause is the distortion of the domestic investment decisions. In addition, Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) shows that Europe is a net debtor on the world capital markets. The
interest payments on debt and equity increase, which reduces welfare. Part of the welfare gain
thus leaks away to the rest of the world.
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Figure 5.3 Indirect tax export aggravates the welfare loss of tax reformsa
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a Welfare effect (%GDP) of multilateral reduction in the CIT-rate with fixed and endogenous rates of return.
Does this average story also hold for each individual member state? Looking at the welfare
effects, depicted in Figure 5.3, the answer is affirmative: most countries are harmed by the
increase in the rates of return. For example, the welfare gain in the Netherlands disappears,
because the investment growth reduces from 1.6% to 1.0% and GDP-growth from 0.3% to 0.1%.
For the East-European countries, their negative foreign asset position is crucial: the costs of
lending increases, which aggravates their welfare loss. Only Portugal and the UK, with
significant holdings of foreign assets, benefit from the higher rates of return.
Countries which are net debtors on the world market should be reluctant to reduce the
CIT-rate, especially if this reform is implemented European-wide.
5.3 Minimum CIT-rate
One way in which member states might prevent a union-wide reduction in CIT-rates is to impose
a minimum rate. For example, European Commission (2001a, p. 405) argues that “However, in
order to avoid any negative effects of tax competition Member States might wish to agree on a
minimum rate, or agree to remain within a specified band around an EU average as a revenue
protecting measure.” How would countries be affected by a floor under CIT-rates?
We limit the analysis to the direct impact of implementing a floor, such that only countries
which are below the floor are enforced to raise their tax rate. We assume that countries with
higher tax rates will stick to their current rates. An interesting second question, of how countries
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could optimally respond to the introduction of a minimum rate, is beyond the scope of the
current paper.
We consider a minimum CIT-rate of 30%, which enforces 6 of the 17 countries, namely
Ireland, Finland, Sweden and the three Eastern European countries, to raise their tax rate.
Beforehand, it is not evident that these countries will lose from this floor: in Figure 4.5 on the
welfare effects of unilateral tax reforms, we have shown that these countries (except Finland) are
worse off with a labour-tax financed reduction of the CIT-rate if other countries do not respond.
Figure 5.4 Welfare effect (%GDP) of 30% minimum CIT-rate
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Figure 5.4 shows that this possible welfare gain will not materialise, however: Ireland, Hungary,
Poland and the Czech Republic will lose welfare if they have to raise their CIT-rates with
respectively 17.5, 12, 11 and 2%-points. Finland, on the other hand, slightly benefits from the
minimum rate, as the gains from higher taxes in its partner countries will outweigh the loss of
the limited tax increase at home (of 1%-point). Sweden enjoys the highest welfare gains arising
from the reduction of the labour-tax rate. Countries which are not directly affected by the
minimum rate, located to the right of the 30%-line, benefit from the reduction in profit shifting
towards the low-tax countries.
For the EU as a whole, the introduction of this minimum rate is about neutral: a small
increase in CIT-revenues allows for a reduction in the average labour-tax rate of 0.2%-point,
which compensates the increase in the METR. GDP in the EU declines with 0.1%, but welfare
hardly changes.23
23 With consumption tax financing a small welfare loss results as the additional CIT-revenues are used to reduce a less
distortive tax rate.
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5.4 CIT-harmonisation: all CIT-rates at EU-average
Is proposing a minimum tax rate already highly controversial, this holds a fortiori for a
harmonisation of the tax rate. One reason is that countries would like to keep control over their
own tax policy. But another might be that some countries fear to lose from tax rate
harmonisation. In this section, we investigate the implications of tax-rate harmonisation at the
current EU-average of 33%.
Figure 5.5 Welfare effect (%GDP) of harmonizing the CIT-rate at the EU average of 33%
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Figure 5.5 gives a very mixed picture of the welfare effects of harmonisation at the current
average of 33%.24 First, in the group of countries with above-average tax rates, there is a couple
of countries (in the fourth quadrant) for which the tax-rate reduction and the accompanying
increase in the labour-tax rate is harmful. For these countries the reduction in the distortion on
corporate income does not outweigh the labour-tax distortion. The first quadrant contains only
two countries which benefit from a CIT-rate reduction, namely Germany and the Netherlands.
For both countries the corporate income tax is highly distortive, see section 3.2.3.
Within the group of countries which have to increase their tax rates under harmonisation,
only Sweden and Denmark benefit: its CIT-rate is less distortive than the labour tax. This
welfare gain does, however, not imply that the Swedish economy will grow: GDP declines
induced by the disincentive for investment. Instead, the welfare gain stems from the reduction in
the labour-tax rate leading to a diminished distortion of the choice between labour and leisure.
24 More details on the simulation results are presented in Table A.1 in the appendix.
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For the largest group of countries, located in the third quadrant, the increase in the CIT-rate
causes a reduction in their welfare. These countries will oppose harmonisation of the CIT-rate,
even though it allows them to reduce the labour tax rate. The higher investment distortion and
the loss of favourable profit shifting is too harmful for them.
Is tax harmonisation at the current average beneficial for the EU as a whole?25The point in
the intersection of both lines shows that the answer in terms of welfare is clearly no! The welfare
gain of winners and the welfare loss of losers cancel out. Table A.1 in the appendix shows that a
similar story holds for the economic effects: the capital stock slightly expands (with 0.14%) but
GDP marginally declines (with −0.02%).
Figure 5.6 Welfare effect (%GDP) of harmonizing the CIT-rate at 20%
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Harmonisation at the current EU-average clearly reduces welfare in many countries. Would
harmonisation at a lower rate be more beneficial for individual member states and for the EU on
average? Figure 5.6 shows the welfare effects of harmonising at a rate of 20%, such that only
Ireland has to raise its tax rate substantially (with 7.5%-point, against 2% and 1% in Hungary
and Poland). Remarkably, harmonisation at a low rate is not beneficial, not for individual
member states and therefore not for the EU on average. Only Germany and the Netherlands
prefer harmonisation at 20% over the current situation in which they lose tax revenues due to
profit shifting.
25 The average CIT-rate of 33% holds for 2002, the year for which we have calibrated our model. Since 2002 several
countries like Austria and the Netherlands have reduced their tax rate. For these countries the change in tax rates towards
the EU-average and the induced change in welfare will differ from the simulation in this section. The qualitative
conclusions of this section, however, still holds. A few changes can be noted though. Austria has in 2005 a below-average
tax rate; its required tax increase leads to a small welfare gain. The tax rate in the Netherlands is in 2005 at the EU
average; harmonisation then hardly benefits anymore. On average, the EU still does not gain from harmonisation.
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Given that harmonisation at a low rate reduces welfare, does the EU benefit from a higher
uniform tax rate? Simulations with our model, where all countries choose the same rate and have
to neutralise their deficits or surpluses with a change in the labour-tax rate, show that the optimal
harmonised CIT-rate is 35%.26 For the EU as a whole, this implies a tiny welfare gain of
0.01%GDP. For individual member states, however, the story that some countries lose but other
gain still stand (quite similar to Figure 5.5).
To sum up, the EU has very few incentives to harmonise, as this hardly improves its economy
on average, but many member states suffer. In addition, we agree with Mendoza and Tesar
(2005) that if there are small costs involved in coordinating tax policy, these costs would likely
eliminate the incentives for cooperation.
26 We ran a grid search over uniform tax rates (between 10 and 50%) and evaluate the compensating variation in all
countries. The GDP-weighted sum reaches its maximum at a CIT rate of 35%.
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6 Sensitivity
In the calibration of CORTAX, as discussed in section 3, we have made several choices. In this
section, we investigate how crucial some of these choices are for the results in the previous
section. To start with, we consider the degree of capital-market integration, as measured by the
stocks of bilateral FDI, and question how the results change if capital markets are more
integrated. In the second subsection, we explore the sensitivity of a few key results to alternative
parameter settings.
6.1 Highly integrated capital markets
The integration of capital markets has accelerated since 1992, see Figure 2.1, and can be
expected to grow further in the near future. Among others, this eases profit shifting between
countries and facilitates the export of capital taxation to foreign owners. Does this imply that tax
competition is more or less likely in highly integrated markets?
Figure 6.1 Welfare gains are larger in a highly integrated capital marketa
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a Welfare gain (%GDP) of unilateral reductions in the CIT-rate; government budgets are closed with change in labour-tax rate.
Consider a doubling of inward and outward FDI as share of GDP, which is the key measure of
capital-market integration in our model. Figure 6.1 shows the implications for welfare in
unilateral tax reforms compared with the welfare changes in the base case, see section 4.2. For
all countries, a highly integrated capital market improves the welfare gain (or diminishes the
loss) from an unilateral reduction of the tax rate, but still many countries do not benefit from an
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unilateral CIT reduction. The main reason for the additional welfare gain is that countries can
more easily attract foreign profits, which broadens their CIT-base and requires a smaller increase
in the labour-tax rate. For Belgium & Luxembourg and the Netherlands, countries with already
intense international linkages in the base case, the CIT-reform now even allows for a reduction in
the labour-tax rate.
For Ireland, however, the rule that a highly integrated capital market improves the welfare
gain from unilateral tax reforms hardly holds. As all other countries, Ireland will be able to
attract more profits than in the base case. The crux to understand the welfare loss is that Ireland
has a much broader tax base to start with in highly integrated capital markets. The tax reform
therefore induces a much stronger reduction in ex ante CIT-revenues, which dominates the
regain of revenues through profit shifting.
Table 6.1 Unilateral tax reforms with 5%-point CIT-reduction and labour-tax financing – with highly integrated
capital markets
Tax rates and revenues Economic effects Welfare
Countrya METR METR CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV CVEU
(b) (a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (y) (y) (yEU )
AUT 0.06 − 1.08 − 0.20 0.35 0.99 0.33 6.29 0.03 − 0.003
BLU 0.08 − 1.44 − 0.09 − 0.42 1.87 1.44 5.84 0.59 − 0.021
DNK 0.06 − 1.20 − 0.23 0.44 1.13 0.43 5.48 0.07 − 0.004
FIN 0.08 − 1.60 − 0.32 0.50 1.76 0.66 5.91 0.17 − 0.004
FRA 0.07 − 1.11 − 0.23 0.53 0.96 0.22 5.35 0.01 − 0.025
DEU 0.12 − 1.99 − 0.32 0.46 2.30 0.79 5.58 0.30 − 0.035
GRC − 0.01 0.36 − 0.03 0.31 − 0.53 − 0.25 5.29 − 0.17 − 0.001
IRL 0.03 − 1.42 − 0.56 1.07 1.63 1.10 8.06 − 0.09 − 0.005
ITA 0.02 − 0.23 − 0.07 0.39 − 0.01 − 0.14 3.29 − 0.07 − 0.010
NLD 0.10 − 1.66 − 0.13 − 0.20 1.90 0.98 5.21 0.56 − 0.025
PRT 0.05 − 0.89 − 0.10 0.30 0.75 0.25 5.37 0.01 − 0.002
ESP 0.06 − 1.06 − 0.21 0.61 1.01 0.28 5.76 0.01 − 0.006
SWE 0.05 − 0.98 − 0.18 0.37 0.84 0.36 5.73 − 0.02 − 0.008
GBR 0.08 − 1.61 − 0.24 0.44 1.52 0.48 6.60 0.10 − 0.044
CZE 0.06 − 1.22 − 0.19 0.72 1.33 0.49 6.73 − 0.01 − 0.001
HUN 0.05 − 1.53 − 0.20 0.82 1.60 0.57 9.05 − 0.05 − 0.002
POL 0.05 − 1.48 − 0.14 0.72 1.44 0.42 8.81 − 0.04 − 0.003
a See Table 4.7 for explanation of the symbols.
Table 6.1 provides a more complete picture of the economic and welfare implications of
unilateral welfare reforms in highly integrated capital markets. A comparison with the
accompanying Table 4.7 reveals that the reduction in CIT-revenues and the required increase in
the labour-tax rate are smaller, for all countries except Ireland. But even Ireland shows a stronger
expansion of the capital stock and a higher growth of GDP. Finally, profit shifting has a
downside in harming other countries more: the reduction in welfare in the rest of the EU (final
column) is stronger.
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In a multilateral reduction of CIT-rates, however, the degree of capital market integration hardly
affects the results. A low-tax country like Ireland loses a bit (an additional welfare reduction of
0.13%GDP) as its CIT-rate reduction is applied to a broader initial tax base. A high-tax country
like Germany benefits a bit more (an additional welfare gain of 0.02%GDP) for a similar reason:
its initial tax base is smaller.
6.2 Sensitivity on key parameters
In section 3.2, we motivated the choices we have made for the key parameters of the model. The
current section shows how alternative choices affect the simulation results. We concentrate on
the unilateral tax-rate reductions, as presented in section 4.2, and compare the average economic
and welfare effects. The first row in Table 6.2 shows the population-weighted average of the 17
unilateral tax-rate reductions of Table 4.7. The subsequent rows present the results of the same
set of simulations under alternative parameter assumptions.27
Table 6.2 Unilateral tax reforms with 5%-point CIT-reduction and labour-tax financing – with alternative base
paths
Countrya Base New CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV CVEU
(y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (y) (yEU )
Base path − 0.23 0.57 1.20 0.30 5.85 0.02 − 0.010
Location specific capitalb 0.03 0.05 − 0.28 1.04 0.86 − 0.03 4.89 − 0.19 − 0.011
Transfer pricingc 1.00 0.50 − 0.24 0.66 1.16 0.21 4.87 − 0.04 − 0.001
Capital-labour substitutiond 0.70 0.50 − 0.23 0.59 0.80 0.18 5.46 0.01 − 0.010
Labour supplye 1.00 0.50 − 0.22 0.53 1.26 0.36 5.91 0.05 − 0.006
a See Table 4.7 for explanation of the symbols.
b Share of location specific capital in GDP, see Table 3.2.
c Elasticity of transfer pricing to tax differentials, see Table 3.2.
d Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, see Table 3.2.
e Intratemporal elasticity of substitution, see Table 3.1.
Consider first the income share of location specific capital, which we double to 5%GDP. This
broadens the CIT-base and makes it less mobile and less responsive to changes in the tax rate.
The reduction of the tax rates by 5%-points, implies therefore a stronger reduction in tax
revenues, which have to be financed with a larger increase of the labour-tax rate. Consequently,
investment grows less and GDP even declines. In terms of welfare, the reform reduces welfare
on average, but the size of the welfare loss is still limited.
Qualitatively similar effects, though quantitatively smaller, are obtained if the sensitivity of
profit shifting to tax-differentials is reduced. Most distinguishing, however, is the impact for
other countries: they hardly lose if profit shifting is weakened.
27 Country-by-country results are presented in Tables A.2 to A.5 in the appendix.
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How tax changes affect the relative demand for labour and capital is determined by the
substitution elasticity between them. Chirinko (2002) shows that the welfare implications of
capital-tax reforms depend on the value of this elasticity. In our simulations, a limitation of the
substitution possibilities reduces the responsiveness of capital to a change in the cost of capital,
as is visible from the smaller growth of the capital stock. The growth of GDP is smaller too, but
the average welfare change is hardly affected: the efficiency gains from a CIT-reduction are
slightly smaller.
What if labour supply responds less to changes in the after-tax wage rate? Now, the key
difference is on the financing side, as the required increase in the labour-income tax has a less
distortive impact on labour supply. The employment reduction is smaller which explains the
higher GDP-growth. The average welfare gain is also larger, as the CIT-reduction is now
financed with a less distortive tax on labour.
Summarising, the sensitivity analysis confirms the key messages of the unilateral tax
reforms, namely that the domestic distortion of both the CIT and the alternative source of
financing crucially determine the economic and welfare effects. The international spillovers via
profit shifting and tax exporting are important, but of second order. Quantitatively, the size of the
effects are robust for the alternative assumptions: the welfare change is and remains small.
60
7 Conclusions
In an integrated Union, member states respond to each other’s changes in corporate income
taxation (CIT) – and for good reasons: a CIT-rate reduction in one country harms other member
states, which they offset by reducing their CIT rates too.
This is not to say that all countries benefit from playing at leapfrog. Even an unilateral
reduction of the tax rate is not beneficial for all countries if they have to finance the tax-rate
reduction by a more distortive tax on labour or consumption. Moreover, taking into account that
other countries will respond significantly reduces the potential gains from a CIT-reform as the
inability to attract foreign profit income reduces the benefits from tax-base broadening. A
reduction in the tax rate is beneficial for countries with a highly distortive CIT-tax, but not for
countries with already small tax bases or low tax rates. Therefore, the latter countries will not
participate in a race to the bottom.
Even countries which benefit from a tax-rate reduction will not completely abandon the tax
on corporate income. At lower CIT-rates, the distortions in the alternative taxes on consumption
and labour exceed the distortive effects of the corporate income tax on investment and profit
shifting. We show that a further integration of European capital markets aggravates the
CIT-distortions, but will still not trigger an abolishment of the CIT.
From an economic point of view, competition in tax rates is hardly worth pursuing at current
levels of corporate-income taxation, and even less so at a lower level of taxation. Policies to
remedy tax competition, like setting a minimum tax rate or even harmonising the CIT-rates,
hardly enhance welfare in the European Union: the winners just gain enough to compensate the
losers. In a subsequent paper, we investigate whether a similar conclusion holds for
harmonisation of the CIT-base.
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Appendix
Table A.1 Harmonisation of the CIT-rate
Tax rates and revenues Economic effects Welfare
Countrya METR METR CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV
(b) (a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (y) (y)
AUT 0.06 − 0.16 − 0.04 0.10 0.12 − 0.04 − 0.61 − 0.03
BLU 0.08 − 0.21 − 0.06 0.19 0.12 − 0.04 0.37 − 0.07
DNK 0.06 0.83 0.17 − 0.42 − 0.73 − 0.14 − 3.53 0.02
FIN 0.08 1.45 0.31 − 0.55 − 1.56 − 0.46 − 4.80 − 0.11
FRA 0.07 − 0.48 − 0.11 0.28 0.39 0.04 1.28 − 0.02
DEU 0.12 − 2.50 − 0.44 0.77 2.80 0.84 6.99 0.25
GRC − 0.01 0.14 − 0.01 0.10 − 0.20 − 0.10 0.80 − 0.06
IRL 0.03 6.99 2.21 − 4.06 − 7.79 − 3.60 − 29.31 − 0.46
ITA 0.02 − 0.23 − 0.08 0.45 − 0.04 − 0.19 2.40 − 0.10
NLD 0.10 − 0.41 − 0.03 − 0.08 0.48 0.21 0.27 0.14
PRT 0.05 0.05 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.05 − 0.03 − 1.39 − 0.01
ESP 0.06 − 0.37 − 0.07 0.23 0.35 0.07 1.09 0.00
SWE 0.05 1.09 0.20 − 0.53 − 0.84 − 0.13 − 5.44 0.09
GBR 0.08 1.11 0.17 − 0.32 − 1.04 − 0.28 − 4.62 − 0.08
CZE 0.06 1.37 0.19 − 0.68 − 1.51 − 0.54 − 6.62 − 0.07
HUN 0.05 5.43 0.63 − 2.32 − 5.81 − 2.00 − 20.61 − 0.28
POL 0.05 4.76 0.40 − 1.99 − 4.70 − 1.31 − 18.37 − 0.15
EU 0.07 0.17 − 0.04 − 0.06 0.14 − 0.02 0.00
a See Table 4.7 for explanation of the symbols.
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Table A.2 Unilateral reduction of CIT-rate – with larger share of location specific capitala
Countryb CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV CV_EU
(y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (yEU )
AUT − 0.29 0.88 0.62 − 0.10 4.98 − 0.24 − 0.002
BLU − 0.25 0.60 1.18 0.46 5.39 − 0.05 − 0.011
DNK − 0.33 1.48 0.55 − 0.23 4.46 − 0.52 − 0.002
FIN − 0.41 1.33 1.20 0.05 5.01 − 0.26 − 0.002
FRA − 0.33 1.35 0.38 − 0.39 4.40 − 0.40 − 0.014
DEU − 0.41 1.14 1.80 0.26 5.40 − 0.04 − 0.019
GRC − 0.08 0.67 − 0.72 − 0.44 3.92 − 0.29 0.000
IRL − 0.62 1.53 1.29 0.52 6.55 − 0.29 − 0.002
ITA − 0.16 0.96 − 0.37 − 0.51 3.16 − 0.30 − 0.006
NLD − 0.30 0.60 1.49 0.41 4.85 0.11 − 0.014
PRT − 0.16 0.63 0.58 0.02 4.57 − 0.14 − 0.001
ESP − 0.27 1.09 0.70 − 0.05 4.88 − 0.17 − 0.003
SWE − 0.28 1.35 0.16 − 0.41 4.35 − 0.62 − 0.004
GBR − 0.32 0.84 1.29 0.17 5.53 − 0.09 − 0.024
CZE − 0.23 1.14 1.05 0.18 5.24 − 0.17 − 0.001
HUN − 0.23 1.24 1.27 0.19 6.21 − 0.23 − 0.001
POL − 0.16 1.04 1.19 0.14 6.12 − 0.16 − 0.002
a Income share of location specific capital is doubled from 0.025%GDP (in basic scenario) to 0.05%GDP. See Table 6.2 for the EU-
average and explanations.
b See Table 4.7 for explanation of the symbols.
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Table A.3 Unilateral reduction of CIT-rate – with less responsive transfer pricesa
Countryb CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV CV_EU
(y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (yEU )
AUT − 0.23 0.46 0.61 0.11 6.05 − 0.03 − 0.002
BLU − 0.19 0.16 1.06 0.64 6.17 0.22 − 0.011
DNK − 0.26 0.71 0.65 0.11 5.12 − 0.10 − 0.002
FIN − 0.35 0.71 1.14 0.33 5.34 0.04 − 0.002
FRA − 0.26 0.68 0.54 0.00 5.02 − 0.08 − 0.013
DEU − 0.36 0.66 1.55 0.45 4.99 0.18 − 0.017
GRC − 0.03 0.32 − 0.45 − 0.25 5.42 − 0.18 0.000
IRL − 0.54 1.10 1.06 0.61 9.69 − 0.10 − 0.003
ITA − 0.08 0.45 − 0.11 − 0.20 3.19 − 0.10 − 0.005
NLD − 0.25 0.25 1.24 0.50 4.35 0.28 − 0.013
PRT − 0.11 0.37 0.49 0.10 5.22 − 0.03 − 0.001
ESP − 0.22 0.67 0.65 0.12 5.49 − 0.02 − 0.003
SWE − 0.21 0.63 0.39 0.00 5.63 − 0.19 − 0.004
GBR − 0.27 0.55 1.03 0.25 6.26 0.04 − 0.022
CZE − 0.20 0.76 0.89 0.27 6.13 − 0.03 − 0.001
HUN − 0.20 0.85 1.07 0.31 8.64 − 0.06 − 0.001
POL − 0.14 0.74 0.97 0.23 8.43 − 0.05 − 0.002
a Elasticity of profit shifting to tax-differentials is reduced from 1.0 (in basic scenario) to 0.5. See Table 6.2 for the EU-average and
explanations.
b See Table 4.7 for explanation of the symbols.
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Table A.4 Unilateral reduction of CIT-rate – with less substitution between labour and capitala
Countryb CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV CV_EU
(y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (yEU )
AUT − 0.23 0.46 0.61 0.11 6.05 − 0.03 − 0.002
BLU − 0.19 0.16 1.06 0.64 6.17 0.22 − 0.011
DNK − 0.26 0.71 0.65 0.11 5.12 − 0.10 − 0.002
FIN − 0.35 0.71 1.14 0.33 5.34 0.04 − 0.002
FRA − 0.26 0.68 0.54 0.00 5.02 − 0.08 − 0.013
DEU − 0.36 0.66 1.55 0.45 4.99 0.18 − 0.017
GRC − 0.03 0.32 − 0.45 − 0.25 5.42 − 0.18 0.000
IRL − 0.54 1.10 1.06 0.61 9.69 − 0.10 − 0.003
ITA − 0.08 0.45 − 0.11 − 0.20 3.19 − 0.10 − 0.005
NLD − 0.25 0.25 1.24 0.50 4.35 0.28 − 0.013
PRT − 0.11 0.37 0.49 0.10 5.22 − 0.03 − 0.001
ESP − 0.22 0.67 0.65 0.12 5.49 − 0.02 − 0.003
SWE − 0.21 0.63 0.39 0.00 5.63 − 0.19 − 0.004
GBR − 0.27 0.55 1.03 0.25 6.26 0.04 − 0.022
CZE − 0.20 0.76 0.89 0.27 6.13 − 0.03 − 0.001
HUN − 0.20 0.85 1.07 0.31 8.64 − 0.06 − 0.001
POL − 0.14 0.74 0.97 0.23 8.43 − 0.05 − 0.002
a Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is reduced from 0.7 (in basic scenario) to 0.5. See Table 6.2 for the EU-average
and explanations.
b See Table 4.7 for explanation of the symbols.
Table A.5 Unilateral reduction of CIT-rate – with less elastic labour supplya
Countryb CIT τl K GDP FDI(in) CV CV_EU
(y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (yEU )
AUT − 0.22 0.39 1.02 0.28 6.50 0.02 − 0.001
BLU − 0.19 0.22 1.39 0.65 6.41 0.17 − 0.007
DNK − 0.26 0.55 1.16 0.36 5.67 0.01 − 0.001
FIN − 0.34 0.63 1.72 0.56 5.95 0.09 − 0.001
FRA − 0.25 0.54 1.05 0.27 5.48 0.01 − 0.008
DEU − 0.35 0.64 2.19 0.63 5.43 0.19 − 0.011
GRC − 0.03 0.24 − 0.39 − 0.13 5.47 − 0.12 0.000
IRL − 0.54 1.04 1.63 0.87 10.20 − 0.06 − 0.002
ITA − 0.08 0.34 0.13 − 0.02 3.42 − 0.03 − 0.003
NLD − 0.24 0.31 1.64 0.54 4.89 0.24 − 0.009
PRT − 0.11 0.34 0.78 0.20 5.53 0.00 − 0.001
ESP − 0.21 0.61 1.08 0.32 5.87 0.02 − 0.002
SWE − 0.20 0.41 0.90 0.29 6.17 − 0.03 − 0.002
GBR − 0.26 0.52 1.52 0.38 6.86 0.06 − 0.013
CZE − 0.19 0.69 1.39 0.50 6.91 0.01 0.000
HUN − 0.20 0.77 1.67 0.58 9.44 − 0.01 0.000
POL − 0.14 0.69 1.50 0.44 9.11 − 0.01 − 0.001
a Intratemporal elasticity of substitution is reduced from 1.0 (in basic scenario) to 0.5. See Table 6.2 for the EU-average and explanations.
b See Table 4.7 for explanation of the symbols.
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